



**From the Inside Out:
Peacebuilding and
Conflict Resolution in a
Changing World Order**

Report | February 2024



Bundeskanzler
Helmut Schmidt
Stiftung

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Research for this report was completed just before the terrorist attacks by Hamas on 7 October 2023 and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. It is still too early to determine the full impact of these unfolding events on the insights presented in this report. It is already becoming evident that some dynamics described in this report will further intensify, such as perceptions of double standards in Western governments' responses to violence and war across the globe (> Chapter 4). Other dynamics may evolve differently, looking for example at the immediate divisions between European governments on Gaza that contrast Europe's early and unequivocal condemnation of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The developments since 7 October nevertheless underscore the critical importance of this report's findings, as they make the task of resolving and transforming armed conflicts more challenging while emphasizing once again the increased importance of sustainable peacebuilding across the globe.

Executive summary

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the first large-scale interstate war in an era marked by intrastate conflict – has been called one of most significant events of our time and a watershed moment or “*Zeitenwende*” for European peace and security, as German chancellor Olaf Scholz put it. Others, such as Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, have noted, however, that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that its problems are the world's problems” and that policy priorities of many countries outside the West are very different.

This report **focuses on views on this issue from conflict-affected countries.** It examines how and to what extent **Russia's ongoing war on Ukraine and wider geopolitical shifts have affected global conflict dynamics, as well as evolving international practices and agendas in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.** What are the direct and indirect effects of the Ukraine war on other conflict-affected countries around the globe? What are the past pitfalls in the field of international peacebuilding that are at risk of being repeated? And what new dilemmas and realities confront international peacebuilding in the context of a changing global order?

The answers to these questions that this report outlines are based on input from members of the *Global Expert Group on Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*, comprising 13 leading representatives of civil society, academia and politics from currently or previously conflict-affected countries who work on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their regions. They met in person in a closed-door workshop and a follow-up video call. This report documents the central themes of the workshop discussions and supports this with information from supplementary in-depth research interviews, an extensive literature review, as well as short “Spotlight” essays written by network members. While the experts' concrete assessments of specific research questions may vary, some general observations can be made and broader recommendations formulated.

The Ukraine war's impact on conflict-affected societies

While the war's reverberations across the globe are complex, multi-layered and far from homogeneous, there are also common aspects that have influenced conflict dynamics in different regions and in increasingly interconnected crisis landscapes.

1. No clear picture and out of the spotlight: The impact of Russia's war on Ukraine has been felt around the globe, but the challenges confronted by conflict-affected countries differ greatly. Not all these effects show up in European political and public discourse or are understood in all their complexity. European policymakers need to become more aware of the various global impacts of their policies, including those aimed at diversifying energy supplies. This requires enhanced capacities for analysis, monitoring and evaluation in order to reduce the risk that policies may reinforce violence and insecurity.

2. Not a game changer, often a crisis amplifier: Rather than a turning point, the global fallout of the Ukraine war has exacerbated existing crises in many conflict-affected countries, for example, concerning local conflicts, structural inequalities, the climate crisis or the post-pandemic recovery. Their complex linkages reveal that actions taken to alleviate some consequences of the Ukraine war – such as the 2022–2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative – are important, but also modest steps in addressing issues such as food insecurity. To find durable solutions to increasingly interconnected crises, European policymakers need to further break down silos between policy fields and mobilize resources in a more integrated manner, much in line with the concept of integrated security at the heart of Germany's new National Security Strategy. This means addressing structural causes and acute drivers of crises simultaneously and providing for spending patterns that follow both short- and long-term objectives.

3. The not so hidden costs of resource shifts: In Europe, the immense public and political focus on Ukraine after February 2022 swiftly crowded out already fading attention to other crises, such as in Afghanistan or Syria. This exacerbates existing donor fatigue and funding gaps. While European policymakers need to prioritize and cannot act everywhere at once, not engaging comes with its own costs. Common perceptions in conflict-affected societies that they are the ones paying for (legitimate) European support to Ukraine fuel debates about Europe's lack of reliability. Peacebuilding is also a long-term commitment, requiring predictable and sustained funding that is well-adapted to societal needs. Any reduction in peacebuilding, humanitarian and development budgets would run counter to rising global needs in these areas. European policymakers should at the very least ensure that efforts to aid Ukraine do not increase funding gaps in other regions.

Past pitfalls of peacebuilding at risk of being repeated

Peacebuilding has changed dramatically over time, but key dilemmas remain. These need to be tackled in order to inform more people-centered and sustainable paths to peace.

4. Accelerating prior trends, revealing new challenges: Russia's war on Ukraine is only one of several factors feeding into the crisis of international peacebuilding. Experts disagree on how big the war's singular effect will be in the medium to long term, in particular looking at the UN's future handling of matters of international peace and security. Overall, they expect the UN to have more pragmatic and limited ambitions in the foreseeable future and stress the need to engage in critical internal reflections on the role of UN peace operations.

5. Geopolitics and human rights: The Ukraine war is also interwoven with trends at the EU level, at which peacebuilding is increasingly being reshaped in militarized and geopolitical terms. But any logic of engagement, for example, in African partner countries, that serves chiefly to promote the EU's geopolitical goals risks neglecting local security needs. This includes ensuring that lethal equipment supplied under the EPF is not misused and worsens human rights violations. To reduce such risks, European policymakers should improve oversight mechanisms and risk assessments, including of possibly disparate or adverse effects of EU support on marginalized groups in conflict-affected countries.

6. Lessons (still not) learned: Concrete insights from past peacebuilding activities are often case-specific, but experts agreed that any solution to the crisis of peacebuilding requires first of all a shift in mindset before changes are made in policy, procedures or programs. This includes moving from top-down lecturing and only paying lip services to principles such as local ownership towards more humility, acknowledging one's own shortcomings, recognizing how neo-colonial attitudes add to peacebuilders' waning legitimacy, and reflecting more realistically on what can be achieved by whom, when and where.

7. Rebuilding Ukraine: As a rare case of international warfare in an era dominated by intrastate conflict it is difficult to apply insights from other contexts to Ukraine. But some knowledge may still apply, for example, on how to coordinate international efforts or help survivors of war crimes. Experiences from other conflicts also show it is imperative that donors supplying Ukraine with arms take concrete steps early on to limit risks of arms diversion. This should include assisting the Ukrainian government to strengthen its security forces' capacity to account for and secure delivered weapons.

Peacebuilding in a changing global order

In order to address global perceptions of and frustrations concerning Western double standards, as well as the enduring structural inequalities of the multilateral system, it is time to rethink and redo international cooperation.

8. Facing new dilemmas and realities: It is not only record-high global military expenditure, eroding arms control frameworks, technological advances in warfare or the rise of “new” actors – such as China – that will affect the future of international peacebuilding. Global frustrations with Western countries’ double standards in dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine compared with their approach to other conflicts across the globe – evident in both the unequal treatment of refugees and the disparate application of rules for conflict resolution – will be a new reference point for old doubts about international peacebuilders’ legitimacy and credibility. Rebuilding this legitimacy and credibility will depend on how coherent and consistent policies are going forward. This will require greater transparency from European policymakers and more honest communication with their partners on what interests their policies serve and the geostrategic reasoning they are rooted in.

9. Redoing international cooperation: Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West’s response to it have also revealed anew the wariness of many countries of the Global South regarding the inefficiency, inequalities and lack of representation in multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF or WTO. Addressing these disparities and building more equal and mutually beneficial global partnerships are interests shared by many countries of the Global South and the West. Decisions taken in multilateral institutions impact the lives of people all over the world. Only if these institutions become more reflective of the interests and realities of the entire world will countries of the Global South also work to preserve them. European governments should use their influence as major donors to push for reforms of multilateral institutions to make them fit to address the global challenges of our time, for example, by giving countries of the Global South a more effective voice and equal representation.

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/01

Introduction



Around the world, 2023 was a violent year. Global battle-related deaths continued to rise, including in Sudan, the South Caucasus, the Middle East and in Russia's war on Ukraine. On some accounts, the Russian invasion stands out: it represents the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years and is thus perhaps "the most significant historical event since the US- and British-led invasion and occupation of Iraq".¹ With ripple effects across the globe and the potential to reshape the European peace and security order for years to come, Russia's attack has been called a historical turning point or "*Zeitenwende*", to use a term coined by German chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech delivered to the German Bundestag on 27 February 2022. Others, such as Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, have asserted that "Europe has to grow out of the mindset that its problems are the world's problems". European policymakers, they say, "would want to see their wars" as events "threatening international stability" but forget that the non-West's priorities are "altogether different".²

This report focuses on views on this issue from conflict-affected countries. Armed conflict tends to multiply existing crises and take away societies' "toolboxes" for responding to sudden external or internal shocks. Therefore, conflict-affected countries are often hit much harder by global crises than societies at peace. The report thus studies how and to what extent **Russia's ongoing war on Ukraine and wider geopolitical shifts have affected global conflict dynamics, as well as evolving international practices and agendas in peacebuilding and conflict resolution**. What are some of the direct and indirect effects of the war on other conflict-affected societies around the globe? What are the past pitfalls in the field of international peacebuilding that are at risk of being repeated? And what new dilemmas and realities confront international peacebuilding in the context of a changing global order?

The answers to these questions outlined in this report are based on input from members of the *Global Expert Group on Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*. The network was established in 2023 by the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung (BKHS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). It invited 13 leading representatives of civil society, academia and politics from currently or previously conflict-affected countries who work on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their countries or regions. They met in person in a closed-door workshop and a follow-up video call to discuss broad trends in the policy field across different – but often entangled – global, regional, national and local contexts. This report documents the central themes of their workshop discussions and

supports this documentation by including information from supplementary interviews with and short “Spotlight” essays written by network members, as well as by drawing on in-depth interviews with additional experts and an extensive literature review. Triangulating these methods and sources, the report formulates the most important insights and ways forward for each research question (> Methodology and terminology).

As a result, this report does not present an all-encompassing and final analysis or a unified, consolidated view of the topic at hand. Instead, its central goal is to inform and expand ongoing conversations on the future of international peacebuilding and conflict resolution. To this end, the report highlights both agreements and disagreements and diverse perspectives among experts; mirrors how decisions made by European policymakers are perceived in different conflict-affected contexts across the globe; and provides expert assessments of some plausible, but sometimes also disputed, ways forward in the field of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Recognizing that the roots and dynamics of armed conflicts are always context-specific, the report shows that there are also common challenges and opportunities for peacebuilding in an ever more complex and often interconnected crisis environment. Hence, while not all the observations and findings in this report are entirely new – some have been known for years, if not decades – reflecting on previous successes and failures can help to inform more people-centered and sustainable approaches in the future.

Methodology and terminology

This report draws on multiple methods and data sources. All major themes are based on input from members of the *Global Expert Group on Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding* in a closed-door workshop and a follow-up video call that took place in June and September 2023, expanded on with in-depth interviews with network members. The key lines of this report thus reflect the themes of the workshop debates rather than an all-encompassing analysis of the topic. The methodological goals of the meetings were to bring together leading experts from currently or previously conflict-affected countries from across the globe, invite them to share individual perspectives, and create dialogue and space for rethinking through strategic foresight exercises, in order to enable cumulative insights across specific geographical settings. Although the meetings were not held under the Chatham House Rule, they were thought of as spaces to encourage open discussion. Therefore, whenever drawing on workshop discussions, this report refrains from identifying speakers or their affiliation, but rather emphasizes whether a statement was a singular opinion or found broader or even overwhelming agreement.

In addition to documenting the workshop discussions, this report also draws on an extensive review of academic articles, think tank publications, policy documents, and op-eds on the topic at hand, particularly previous writings by members of the *Global Expert Group on Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*. The authors also conducted 35 semi-structured in-depth research interviews, and just as many informal background conversations, with academics, employees of think tanks, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and diplomats from April to October 2023. The text references only the interviews most relevant to our analysis. We conducted all interviews on the condition of anonymity and used a combination of specific targeting and snowball sampling to select interviewees. When quoting directly from interviews, we do so as verbatim as possible, but smooth out fillers, hesitation markers, grammatical mistakes or broken sentences to improve readability.

We have chosen to use compound terms such as “Global South” or “the West” in this report, even though they remain contested as there is no universally accepted definition or clear categorization of countries and these terms do not reflect the heterogeneity within and differences between countries. As this report is based primarily on the workshop discussions of the *Global Expert Group on Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*, we use these terms if used by the group itself, but we make use of more precise descriptions whenever possible. Single network members may use other terms in their “Spotlight” essays in this report.

/02

The Ukraine war's impact on conflict-affected societies

What are the direct and indirect effects of Russia's war against Ukraine on other conflict-affected societies? While the war's reverberations across the globe are multi-layered and far from homogeneous, there are also common aspects that influence conflict dynamics in different regions and in increasingly interconnected crisis landscapes.

Key findings and ways forward

1. No clear picture and out of the spotlight:

The impact of Russia's war on Ukraine has been felt around the globe, but the challenges confronted by conflict-affected countries differ greatly. Not all these effects show up in European political and public discourse or are understood in all their complexity. European policymakers need to become more aware of the various global impacts of their policies, including those aimed at diversifying energy supplies. This requires enhanced capacities for analysis, monitoring and evaluation in order to reduce the risk that policies may reinforce violence and insecurity.

2. Not a game changer, often a crisis amplifier:

Rather than a turning point, the global fallout of the Ukraine war has exacerbated existing crises in many conflict-affected countries, for example, concerning local conflicts, structural inequalities, the climate crisis or the post-pandemic recovery. Their complex linkages reveal that actions taken to alleviate some consequences of the Ukraine war – such as the 2022–2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative – are important, but also modest steps in addressing issues such as food insecurity. To find durable solutions to increasingly interconnected crises, European policymakers need to further break down silos between policy fields and mobilize resources in a more integrated manner, much in line with the concept of integrated security at the heart of Germany's new National Security Strategy. This means addressing structural causes and acute drivers of crises simultaneously and providing for spending patterns that follow both short- and long-term objectives.

3. The not so hidden costs of resource shifts:

In Europe, the immense public and political focus on Ukraine after February 2022 swiftly crowded out already fading attention to other crises, such as in Afghanistan or Syria. This exacerbates existing donor fatigue and funding gaps. While European policymakers need to prioritize and cannot act everywhere at once, not engaging comes with its own costs. Common perceptions in conflict-affected societies that they are the ones paying for (legitimate) European support to Ukraine fuel debates about Europe's lack of reliability. Peacebuilding is also a long-term commitment, requiring predictable and sustained funding that is well-adapted to societal needs. Any reduction in peacebuilding, humanitarian and development budgets would run counter to rising global needs in these areas. European policymakers should at the very least ensure that efforts to aid Ukraine do not increase funding gaps in other regions.

/No clear picture and out of the spotlight

The impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been felt around the globe. Besides the devastating humanitarian crisis in Ukraine – with millions of displaced persons because of heavy fighting and a poverty rate that rose from 5.5 per cent in 2021 to 24.2 per cent in 2022 alone³ – the war and subsequent sanctions imposed on Russia have added to global inflation, upended energy markets, proliferated security risks, contributed to soaring food and fertilizer prices, and hindered multilateral action on pressing issues. In the long run, these repercussions are likely to have a cascading impact, not only, but especially on other countries affected by armed conflict and war. Conflict tends to multiply existing crises and take away societies' "toolboxes" for responding to sudden shocks. Countries at war are therefore often hit much harder by crises than countries at peace. The ripple effects of Russia's war on Ukraine could further aggravate known conflict-drivers and threat multipliers such as bread prices and thus exacerbate risks of new or prolonged violence for years to come.

Zooming in, however, reveals that **the fallout from Russia's war against Ukraine has thus far not been felt the same way in conflict-affected societies around the world. Some of its diverse effects have remained outside the spotlight of European political and public discourse or are not understood in their full complexity.** The war's economic consequences are a case in point, as no clear picture has emerged of the war's global repercussions. For some countries affected by war and armed conflict around the world, Russia's attack on Ukraine has not posed a tangible or even existential threat. Instead, it feels distant and remote in the face of ongoing local violence or other, more pressing humanitarian and economic crises.⁴ In other conflict-affected countries across the globe, the economic fallout from the Ukraine war has had a more severe impact. This is often contingent on a country's level of dependency on Russian and Ukrainian imports or on more indirect and regional contagion effects. One example is Syria, where more than 300,000 civilians have been killed since the onset of war in 2011 – an average of 84 civilians a day, according to the United Nations (UN).⁵ Russia's war on Ukraine has "made an already difficult humanitarian situation even worse"⁶ for Syrians, who have been hit by war, displacement or the impacts of the financial crisis in Lebanon, harming a population "already suffocating"⁷ and raising fears of ever-increasing levels of donor fatigue and funding gaps. Sri Lanka – still recovering from a civil war between its government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebel group that ended in 2009 – is a second case in point. Rising inflation, power cuts and food shortages, as well as a

drop in Russian and Ukrainian tourism as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine were only the last straw on top of an already dire economic situation and years of economic mismanagement.⁸ These factors triggered a series of mass protests that led to cabinet resignations and to former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fleeing the country. While it "may seem strange to link street protests against the Sri Lankan government to a war in Europe", some write, "food and oil markets are global".⁹ These economic and humanitarian impacts, experts point out, are often more important to many conflict-affected societies than discussions and concerns about changing security orders or global geopolitical rivalries.

This heterogeneity regarding the Ukraine war's global fallout in conflict-affected countries also comes to light when looking at its influence on security dynamics elsewhere. Two years into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia's direct military involvement in other wars and armed conflicts across the globe has changed and is expected to change further, some experts argue. Russia's war on Ukraine continues to consume much of its military capabilities and attention, which has the potential to alter conflict dynamics elsewhere: the Azerbaijani government's September 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh is a case in point. In workshop discussions and interviews, some experts pointed to the long declining Russian arms export industry to which its war on Ukraine and the subsequent Western sanctions have dealt a "knockout blow"¹⁰: they intensify Russian defense production difficulties and, in the medium to long term, could lead to ammunition shortages or a transfer of military personnel and hardware away from other warzones. Mounting Russian losses in Ukraine in the wake of Russia's failure to achieve rapid military success raise further doubts about Russia's military capabilities and the quality and reputation of its weapons in other countries.¹¹ Other experts, however, are more cautious in their assessment of the Ukraine war's impact on Russian military engagement elsewhere. Looking at military cooperation and supply contracts, they emphasize that states, such as in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), usually maintain diverse regional and international military partnerships which they have carefully balanced for years, including contracts that often run for decades and that entail vast technological path dependencies which are difficult to change in the short run.¹²

The more indirect security repercussions of Russia's war on Ukraine in other regions around the world also reveal a complex multiplicity. To give a few examples, policymakers in many African states are keeping a close watch on the European Union's (EU) unparalleled use of its European Peace Facility (EPF) in Ukraine. Through this off-budget instrument, created in 2021, the EU is funding the delivery of lethal military equipment to a country at war for the first time in its history. This has raised questions among many African policymakers about the availability of funds for the EU-Africa security partnership in the years to come (> Chapter 3). Often outside the spotlight of European political

and public discourse are the societal consequences of the Ukraine war in many currently or previously conflict-affected countries. In the Western Balkans, for instance, survivors of the war in Bosnia relive past trauma by witnessing the aggression against Ukraine, which brings back “all these pictures of aggression and killing and mass graves and mass systematic rapes, everything we were suffering through”.¹³ In East Asia, where China’s military expenditure has increased for 28 uninterrupted years,¹⁴ Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated fears among China’s neighbors. For instance, social media slogans such as “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow”, which trended in 2022, highlight peoples’ increased insecurity about potential attacks since Russia’s war on Ukraine. And in the workshop discussions and interviews, some experts underlined that the complexity of some ripple effects of the Ukraine war is also not fully understood. For instance, European governments’ moves to become more independent of Russian oil and gas by placing energy supply on a broader footing and transitioning towards renewable energy sources have unaccounted for spillover effects around the world. Energy diversification, they point out, is often thought of and framed in European public and political discourse as a way forward for energy security, environmental sustainability and as potentially also increasing windfalls for commodity exporters elsewhere, who “benefit from high prices and demand” in Europe.¹⁵ But in regions such as Latin America, the upending of global energy markets since February 2022 is also closely intertwined with questions of peace and security, particularly among vulnerable and marginalized communities (> Spotlight 2.1). This raises the question of what “clean” energy means for whom and shows that European policymakers need to become more aware of possible spillover effects and the diverse global social, security, and environmental impacts of their policies. This requires enhanced capacities for analysis, monitoring and evaluation in order to reduce risks that policies may reinforce violence and insecurity.

The war in Ukraine has forced European governments to seek new sources of oil and gas in order to reduce their dependency on Russia as an energy supplier. This has been interpreted by many – in both Europe and other regions – as an opportunity for energy exporting countries. Governments and companies in the energy sector in Latin America, for example, have welcomed this access to the European market with open arms. But what some see as an opportunity has a very different meaning for others. Vulnerable communities are at renewed risk of violence and insecurity in many Latin American countries – violence and insecurity that is linked to activities in the energy sector.

In Latin America, indigenous, afro-descendant and other rural communities have lived for hundreds of years in areas where oil, gas, carbon, lithium and other minerals are extracted. They have historically opposed extractive industries for both cultural and environmental reasons. Extractive operations have a profoundly negative impact on their traditional territories and ways of life: these operations destroy sacred sites and landscapes, pollute water sources, and increase risks to food security. Even the construction of hydropower dams and other water infrastructure as a source of “cleaner” and renewable energy can negatively impact territories and populations through forced displacement. This raises the question of what “clean” energy means – and for whom.

Extractive operations in the region have in the past also been linked to grave human rights violations. The responses of national governments in Latin America to these violations, however, have been either lacking, repressive or violent. Governments have often criminalized protests and have deployed the military and the police to ensure the normal operation of extractive companies – companies which are rarely held accountable for their activities. Often, government responses have led to the deaths of civilians, which are not investigated because there are significant barriers of access to justice for these communities.¹⁶ All this takes place in the context of complex violence and insecurity dynamics in the region. Latin America remains one of the most violent regions in the world – about one-third of the world’s murders occur there every year.¹⁷ It is also the most dangerous region for environmental activists and defenders. Their opposition to extractive industries – and to extractivism in general, because of its impact on the environment and the climate crisis – is often met with threats, intimidation and even murder, especially in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Mexico.¹⁸

Spotlight 2.1:

/ Clean energy for whom?



Catalina Niño

As a result, the opportunity to become an energy provider for Europe has the potential to fuel violence and insecurity in Latin America, which primarily affects already vulnerable communities. Public and policy debates about clean energy and energy diversification and transition need to take seriously the voices of the communities and peoples directly impacted by extractive activities. European governments looking to import energy from Latin America should not only be aware of their policies' diverse social and environmental impacts. They should also use their leverage to encourage a different approach when human rights abuses are being committed by partner governments in the region.

While the challenges confronted by conflict-affected countries following Russia's war on Ukraine have thus differed greatly, there are also common trends affecting conflict dynamics in different regions and in increasingly interconnected "crisis landscapes".¹⁹ The first one that almost all experts pointed to during workshop discussions and interviews is that **the Ukraine war is in many contexts not perceived as a historic turning point or "Zeitenwende" – a brazen attack on the global order as we know it – but rather as an amplifier, multiplier and accelerator of existing crises** at the global, regional, national and local levels.

This dynamic is particularly evident when zooming in on the multi-layered linkages between four short- and long-term variables: (i) the immediate global economic fallout of Russia's war on Ukraine; (ii) pre-existing violence in conflict-affected countries around the world; (iii) structural international economic inequalities; and (iv) the mounting challenges of the climate crisis and the post-Covid-19-pandemic recovery. Russia's war against Ukraine has proved once again how food can be weaponized in war. It has vastly exacerbated food insecurity in many countries around the world because of their reliance on both countries' grain exports. But experts note that this ripple effect of the Ukraine war cannot be separated from existing international inequalities and other, often structural reasons for food insecurity (> Spotlight 2.2).

/Not a game changer, often a crisis amplifier

In many parts of the world, such as South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa or the MENA region, extreme weather events – including heavy droughts or heatwaves – as well as a lack of food sovereignty have also negatively affected local food production and harvest potentials for years. This increased malnutrition rates and hunger long before February 2022, further aggravating conflict risks. Warfare has moreover damaged critical infrastructures, destroyed crops, contaminated agricultural land, and blocked the distribution of food for years in many societies affected by it. This often disproportionately hits smallholder farmers and rural populations. In 2022, extreme weather events destroyed wheat crops precisely at a time when the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine also radically reduced exports from Ukraine and Russia to many world regions. This led countries such as India, “whose emergency grain reserves were already depleted”²⁰ by the Covid-19 pandemic, to impose bans on rice exports.

These many complex linkages underscore how actions to alleviate the global economic impact of the Ukraine war – in particular the Black Sea Grain Initiative in place between July 2022 and July 2023 – are important, but also modest measures to address issues such as food insecurity. Increasingly interconnected crises cannot be solved in an isolated manner. To find solutions, European policymakers need to further break down silos between policy fields and mobilize resources in a more integrated manner, much in line with the concept of integrated security at the heart of Germany’s new National Security Strategy. This also means addressing structural causes and acute drivers of crises simultaneously and providing for spending patterns that follow both short- and long-term policy objectives.

Spotlight 2.2:

/Structures and symptoms of food insecurity



Joseph Daher



Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly impacted the global economy, especially in commodity markets. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are suffering from these dynamics, most notably through the severe rise in food, oil and gas prices. They often depend primarily on Ukraine and/or Russia for food imports, especially wheat and cereals. Egypt is, for example, the world's largest wheat importer, with between 70 and 80 per cent of its supply coming from Russia and Ukraine. But while global food shortages due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine have captured media headlines and policy debates, this food crisis cannot be separated from the structural reasons that render several Middle Eastern and African countries vulnerable to food imports.

The global trend in neoliberalization, which focused on the agricultural sector in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, is a significant reason many countries became reliant on imported grain and other staples in the first place. These policies – supported by international monetary institutions, such as the World Bank – took different paths according to the specificities of each country. However, they resulted in fundamental changes in the use and ownership of land, food production means, and rural life. The central orientation was to modify agricultural activities toward forms of private ownership linked to international trade. These dynamics encouraged the adoption of a model of intensive industrial export-led agriculture, focusing on the most profitable crops, such as fruits or vegetables, and cash crops, such as coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco, to the detriment of edible crops and cereals. This contributed to the development of agribusiness-dominated markets, with monopolistic structures controlled by large corporations and big landowners. Governments gradually opened up their economies to international capital with an orientation towards comparative advantage rather than economic diversification and domestic-led industrialization. These policies benefited large landowners – who consolidated their positions by purchasing more land and developing their landholdings – at the cost of smallholder farmers. It also incentivized importing agricultural and manufactured products at the risk of depressing smallholder farmers' domestic production and stunting the growth of local manufacturing industry.

A second structural challenge that renders countries vulnerable to food imports is the lack of fiscal space to cope with rising food prices induced by the current global food crisis. For example, countries such as Spain – which imported 38 per cent of its maize and 25 per cent of

its barley from Ukraine before the war²¹ – can absorb some of the food shortages by purchasing food at a higher price from the global food market. Import-dependent developing countries, however, already struggling to come out of the Covid-19 economic crisis, lack the means to do so. According to *The Economist*, in 2023 sub-Saharan African countries will on average spend 17 per cent of their GDP to service their debt.²² Egypt in 2023/2024 will even have to allocate more than half its budget (56 per cent) to debt servicing,²³ meaning its government will have to make severe budgetary concessions to bear the cost of the food crisis while maintaining its debt servicing obligations and other national priorities.

But why are many developing countries in debt distress? Commodity-oriented economic policies destabilize countries' import–export balance sheets, as they cannot easily compensate for rising costs of manufactured goods when the commodity markets they sell to are volatile. While governments often turn to domestic and international financial markets to borrow and invest in infrastructure or social programs needed for development, developing countries often face much more structural barriers to access finance. Finance from Bretton Woods institutions and the global financial architecture have far less money to offer developing countries than developed ones, and developing countries often face high interest rates when they need to borrow. Global risk assessments and credit grading mechanisms also tend to disfavor developing countries because of a lack of data, nuanced understanding of context and even bias. All of this affects a country's credit rating, which in turn affects its ability to borrow in global markets. This has been made even more apparent in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, from which many developing countries have not yet fully recovered. Many countries are thus experiencing the economic shock induced by the war in Ukraine before they have really recovered from the economic fallout of the pandemic.

The global food and economic crisis brought on by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine should thus be understood as a symptom of pre-existing structural failures in global food and financial systems. Global efforts to manage the immediate effects of the crisis should not detract from the much-needed global discourse around food sovereignty and reform of the global financial system. Instead, we need to reframe the debate to emphasize food sovereignty, whereby food is considered a right rather than a commodity subject to profitability, the rights and dignity of food producers are respected, and ecological harmony is prioritized over financial gain. Similarly, global financial systems need to be reformed to tune in to the needs of developing countries, not only in light of global development needs and the aspiration to attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but also in view of the compounding effects of climate change and their disproportionate effect on countries in Africa and the Middle East.

/The not so hidden costs of resource shifts

A second common challenge for many conflict-affected countries following Russia's attack on Ukraine, many experts agreed, concerns how **the immense public and political focus on Ukraine in many European countries, as well as in the United States, swiftly "crowded out" attention to other crises and conflicts. This raises concerns about development, humanitarian and peacebuilding funding in these contexts.** The Syrian war and the enduring humanitarian emergency in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover in 2021 were cited as examples of this dynamic. This, many of the experts noted, certainly cannot be completely separated from existing concerns about funding cuts, half-hearted engagement ill-adapted to local needs, and donor fatigue among both policymakers and publics in Europe and the United States. This long growing fatigue, for instance, often has its roots in the sheer longevity of wars and interventions, or in the lack of peacebuilding successes.

Russia's war against Ukraine is also not the only factor exacerbating funding gaps in peacebuilding, development and humanitarian budgets. Such gaps are also due to tightened national budgets following the Covid-19 pandemic or changing foreign policy priorities among donors. The support to Ukraine and the spending on in-donor refugee costs by many European governments have led to record high development and humanitarian budgets. However, need also continues to grow – and more rapidly so – in other regions, because of both the ripple effects of Russia's war on Ukraine and other crises.²⁴ Those working on peacebuilding across the globe fear that, with European governments' crisis portfolios likely focused on Ukraine for years to come, any already declining or half-hearted engagement elsewhere will become even more half-hearted, lacking knowledge, financial resources and political will for long-term commitments.²⁵

Employees of think tanks, international NGOs and advocacy groups interviewed for this report, for instance, agreed overwhelmingly that European policymakers do not want "to think about two crises at once".²⁶ They describe their experiences of meeting with European policymakers after the 24 February 2022 attack, who they remember as being so focused on the war in Ukraine that it was difficult to "even have a conversation" on other conflicts and crises "for months", or to attract policymakers' attention unless they used "the Ukraine hook". They also witnessed a "desperate need to stay on radar" among their colleagues working on peacebuilding elsewhere, pointing to countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia in particular.²⁷ Some interviewees also report

resorting to strategies of framing everything “through the prism of the Ukraine war”.²⁸ Humanitarian organizations meanwhile raised concerns that aid to other conflict-affected countries had been deprioritized since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at a time when the impact of the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic have already worsened living conditions around the globe: “It took Somalia, for instance, nearly an entire year to receive 68 per cent of its requested funding, whereas humanitarian targets for Ukraine were achieved at the same levels in a matter of six weeks”.²⁹

Given mounting global challenges, of course, European policymakers must prioritize and cannot act everywhere at all times. Half-hearted engagement in many different conflicts at once neither solves these crises sustainably, nor helps European governments to achieve their foreign policy goals. But not engaging comes with its own costs. The widespread global perception in many conflict-affected societies that they are the ones paying for (legitimate) European support to Ukraine has given rise to debates in these societies about broken agreements and Europe’s unreliability (> Chapter 4). Peacebuilding in all world regions is also a long-term commitment. It requires adequate, predictable and sustained funding well-adapted to societal needs. Reductions in peacebuilding, development and humanitarian budgets in the medium to long term would run counter to rising global needs in these areas. At the very least, European policymakers should thus ensure that any increase in in-donor refugee costs due to Russia’s war against Ukraine is additional to existing budgets for development, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance for other contexts, so that efforts to aid Ukraine do not exacerbate funding gaps in other regions.

“The EU is going to run out of money. Ukraine will have consequences for what is available from the EU. And the EU is going to be having less money for development and peacebuilding, which will have all sorts of consequences.”

Interview with an employee of an international NGO, 8 June 2023

/03

Past pitfalls of peacebuilding at risk of being repeated ■

What were the main shortcomings of international peacebuilding in the past and how can they be addressed? Peacebuilding has changed over time, and Russia's war on Ukraine is only one of many factors feeding into its crisis. But key dilemmas remain that can be tackled in order to inform more people-centered and sustainable paths to peace.

Key findings and ways forward

1. Accelerating prior trends, revealing new challenges:

Russia's war on Ukraine is only one of several factors feeding into the crisis of international peacebuilding. Experts disagree on how big the war's singular effect will be in the medium to long term, in particular looking at the UN's future handling of matters of international peace and security. Overall, they expect the UN to have more pragmatic and limited ambitions in the foreseeable future and stress the need to engage in critical internal reflections on the role of UN peace operations.

2. Geopolitics and human rights:

The Ukraine war is also interwoven with trends at the EU level, at which peacebuilding is increasingly being reshaped in militarized and geopolitical terms. But any logic of engagement, for example, in African partner countries, that serves chiefly to promote the EU's geopolitical goals risks neglecting local security needs. This includes ensuring that lethal equipment supplied under the EPF is not misused and worsens human rights violations. To reduce such risks, European policymakers should improve oversight mechanisms and risk assessments, including of possibly disparate or adverse effects of EU support on marginalized groups in conflict-affected countries.

3. Lessons (still not) learned:

Concrete insights from past peacebuilding activities are often case-specific, but experts agreed that any solution to the crisis of peacebuilding requires first of all a shift in mindset before changes are made in policy, procedures or programs. This includes moving from top-down lecturing and only paying lip services to principles such as local ownership towards more humility, acknowledging one's own shortcomings, recognizing how neo-colonial attitudes add to peacebuilders' waning legitimacy, and reflecting more realistically on what can be achieved by whom, when and where.

4. Rebuilding Ukraine:

As a rare case of international warfare in an era dominated by intrastate conflict it is difficult to apply insights from other contexts to Ukraine. But some knowledge may still apply, for example, on how to coordinate international efforts or help survivors of war crimes. Experiences from other conflicts also show it is imperative that donors supplying Ukraine with arms take concrete steps early on to limit risks of arms diversion. This should include assisting the Ukrainian government to strengthen its security forces' capacity to account for and secure delivered weapons.

/Accelerating prior trends, revealing new challenges

Practices of peacebuilding and conflict resolution have changed dramatically over the decades. Liberal peacebuilding, once the most prominent form of international engagement in conflict-affected societies during the 1990s and early 2000s, has declined, as both profound academic criticism and a series of failed interventions have put its legitimacy in doubt.³⁰ Liberal peacebuilding is criticized most frequently for implementing top-down “one-size-fits-all” blueprints for peace – blueprints applied by donors “regardless of the particular characteristics of the context”.³¹ This entails employing state-centric perspectives to peace or democracy that follow Western experiences but that remain unresponsive to needs and realities in other regions. As a result, liberal peacebuilding has also had limited impact on empowering marginalized groups, such as young people and women. In recent years, the paradigm’s dwindling legitimacy, new security challenges such as cyber warfare or hybrid threats, and changing security priorities among donor governments have paved the way for alternative approaches to addressing violent conflict, notably stabilization missions and counter-terrorism measures, for example, in Mali or the Central African Republic (CAR).³²

Against this background, Russia’s war on Ukraine is thus only one of several factors feeding into prior trends and the crisis of international peacebuilding. In the workshop discussions and interviews, experts disagreed on how big the Ukraine war’s singular effect on this dynamic will plausibly be in the medium to long term, but stressed a number of unresolved issues and likely ways forward for peacebuilding practices in the UN and EU.

Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as wider geopolitical shifts, will affect the UN’s structures for and role in international peacebuilding in the years to come. Both the Russian war on Ukraine and the growing divisions between the major powers have made much-needed multilateral cooperation and finding compromise in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) harder.³³ This, some stress, has again exposed the UN’s lack of efficiency in dealing with crises of international peace and security. They refer, for instance, to UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ inability to mediate between Russia and Ukraine³⁴ or to the UNSC’s failure to deal with a war of aggression started by one of its permanent members, which gave new impetus to longstanding – but not necessarily realistic – calls for its reform.³⁵ Experts also expressed concerns about the war’s spillover effects on UNSC engagement in other conflicts in which Russia has a major security interest. As one example they pointed to Russia blocking

a resolution to renew the cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid into northern Syria in July 2023.³⁶ Some countries of the Global South have also emphasized that the focus on Ukraine has taken away attention from dealing with other pressing issues that are among their priorities, such as implementing the SDGs, reforming the international financial system or developing strategies for achieving climate justice.³⁷

However, other experts underlined that the UNSC was able to maintain a level of cooperation between Russia and the West on issues such as the humanitarian emergency in Afghanistan. The UNSC also managed to extend missions outside core Russian security interests, such as the mandate of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The UN is generally used to adapting to “big shocks to the system” and the broader UN system has been able to keep up a response to the unfolding crisis in Ukraine at the technical level (for example, continued assistance from the UN Development Programme or the UN Refugee Agency), the political level (for example, brokering the 2022–2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative), and the legal level (for example with regard to the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court).³⁸ While the shrinking support for large-scale peacekeeping operations – the most recent of which was set up in 2014 – is evident, this is also not necessarily because of divisions between Russia and the West. The gap between the huge financial cost and personnel needs of peacekeeping operations, on one hand, and the uncertain success of large-scale missions that are not necessarily calibrated to local needs, on the other, are further reasons for the ambiguous future of such missions.³⁹ Taken together, these trends show that the UN’s role in handling future crises affecting international peace and security is uncertain. Overall, the experts thus expect the UN to have more pragmatic and limited ambitions in the years to come and stress the need to engage in critical internal reflections on the role of UN peace operations.⁴⁰

“ The biggest threat to the [UN] architecture, I think, is the breakdown of consensus at the macro level. The unique legitimacy or credibility that the UN has starts to come into question. ”

Interview with a think tank researcher, 24 August 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine is also interwoven with trends at the EU level, at which peacebuilding is increasingly being reshaped in militarized and geopolitical terms. Once a keen promoter of liberal peacebuilding, more recently the EU has put a strong emphasis on military capacity-building in conflict-affected countries.⁴¹ This “ambition to ‘play hardball’”,⁴² as some have described this trend, long precedes Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and goes back to (at least) the publication of the Global Strategy strategic framework in 2016. But in workshop discussions and interviews, the experts agreed that the return of high-intensity war to Europe will probably accelerate this trend “exponentially” and make the expansion of defense budgets and capabilities among EU Member States, together with delivering military aid to Ukraine, the core priorities for European governments and EU institutions for years to come.⁴³ This “new security consciousness in Europe” will affect how the EU supports peace elsewhere.⁴⁴

There is, however, some disagreement among the experts regarding the direction this transformation will take. Some expect less overall external engagement by the EU and its Member States because of the altered security situation in Europe after February 2022. They argue that European policymakers will focus their efforts on protecting European territory rather than prioritizing the financing and staffing of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations or other forms of engagement in other world regions, perhaps with the exception of the EU’s role in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, or the Western Balkans. For instance, the considerable support provided to Ukraine under the EPF – which, as of October 2023, amounted to more than 5 billion euro for lethal and non-lethal military equipment, ammunition, medical and engineering items, as well as training through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)⁴⁵ – has left many African policymakers wondering whether they can still rely on the EU to finance peace support operations on their continent and at the necessary scale, for example, in Somalia.⁴⁶ Other experts foresee change not in the *scale*, but rather in the *type* of EU engagement. They stress that the EU’s use of the EPF to deliver lethal equipment to Ukraine is one of the clearest signals of the end of an era in which the EU styled itself as a civilian power in global affairs. They expect that support for Ukraine under the EPF will set a “precedent” concerning how the EU acts elsewhere. In other words, it is likely to take an ever more militarized approach to conflicts in other regions in accordance with logics of engagement driven first and foremost by its geopolitical competition with Russia.⁴⁷ In the long run, this could, as one interviewee put it, perhaps also improve the EU’s response to violent conflict, for instance by becoming better at addressing disinformation and foreign interference as a driver of such conflicts.⁴⁸

The experts agreed overwhelmingly, however, that any logic of engagement in crises and conflicts worldwide that serves chiefly to

promote the EU's own geopolitical goals also carries the risk of neglecting or deprioritizing local security needs. This includes, for instance, the EU failing to ensure that supplied arms, ammunition and military equipment are not misused and diverted and end up in the wrong hands. This in turn can backfire and endanger sustainable peacebuilding processes, perhaps greatly exacerbating human rights violations or conflict dynamics. To mitigate such unintended effects, policymakers in the EU and its Member States should at the very least increase institutional oversight mechanisms for funding arms, ammunition and equipment deliveries under the EPF and improve assessments of the main risks attached to EPF shipments, including of potentially disparate or adverse effects of their support on marginalized communities in EPF-recipient countries.

“ It seems to be the case that it’s more about sending a political message to Russia, instead of trying to really scope the whole range of action that the EU is taking in any specific context where the European Peace Facility is being used, including the security needs of civilian populations. ”

Interview with an employee of an international NGO, 5 May 2023

/Lessons (still not) learned

Against the background of the evolving nature of international peacebuilding, what are the past pitfalls in the field and how can efforts be improved? While the roots and dynamics of conflicts are always context-specific, reflecting on previous peacebuilding successes and failures can help to inform more people-centered and sustainable approaches in the future. Hence, while none of the observations below are entirely new – many have been known for years, if not decades – they need to be re-emphasized, as their implementation requires first of all a shift in mindset before changes are made in policies, procedures or programs. The experts stressed this point with regard to two broad lessons in particular.

The first broad takeaway concerns **moving from top-down lecturing to more humility in peacebuilding**. Factors that in the past have added to the crisis of international peacebuilding – including the lack of context-specific knowledge among peacebuilders, half-hearted engagement ill-adapted to local needs and Western peacebuilders' waning legitimacy and credibility (> Chapter 4) – can be mitigated. This requires peacebuilders to acknowledge their shortcomings, recognize how their own neo-colonial attitudes, behaviors and power imbalances may hinder peacebuilding success,⁴⁹ and reflect more realistically on what can be achieved by whom, when and where.⁵⁰ The war in Afghanistan and ultimately the fall of Kabul in August 2021, after decades of violence – and a huge international engagement – was referred to most often in discussions as perhaps the clearest and most painful lesson in this regard.

Another recent example routinely cited as illustrating both the lack of humility and the prevalence of neo-colonial attitudes among Western policymakers was their behavior towards African colleagues right after Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The ensuing voting patterns in the UNGA – such as on resolution ES-11/1 in March 2022, in which almost 50 per cent of African countries abstained or stayed away – demonstrated, as one expert put it, not only global differences in views of the war, but also the lack of understanding among many Western policymakers on the source of those different views.⁵¹ They tended to frame this voting behavior and the refusal of many African countries to condemn the Russian invasion not in terms of these countries' national interests – such as avoiding being drawn into an international conflict – but as stemming primarily from Russian pressure, propaganda and disinformation. This “left African countries wondering if their agency would ever be respected” if their positions do not align with the West and illustrates an almost colonial-minded expectation of their “unequivocal

support”.⁵² Furthermore, as one interviewee emphasized, there generally seems to be little willingness among policymakers in Europe and North America to accept that anti-Western sentiments in other world regions, such as on the African continent, “are not just coming from Russian disinformation”⁵³ or due to the increased geopolitical competition between Russia and the West, but also have their roots in ineffective and failed Western-led peacebuilding efforts in many countries in the region.

“ [When we look at peacemaking moving forward], there has to be a humility in the analysis, because when something is not in your backyard, then you do not react to it the same way. ”

Interview with Global Expert Group member Hafsa Maalim, 4 July 2023

The second broad takeaway that might help in addressing past peacebuilding pitfalls concerns moving **from paying lip service to principles such as local ownership towards a better understanding of and listening to the diversity of local voices**. Time and again, lessons from prior peacebuilding cases demonstrate that international political, financial and technical assistance alone cannot build sustainable peace, but only increase its chances (if done right). Instead, practitioners and academics agree that sustainable peacebuilding requires broad local participation in the design and implementation of programs and in political decision-making at all levels (> Spotlight 3.1). This, in turn, requires adequate training and capacity-building for diverse local stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, and women and young people in particular. Without sufficient local ownership, peace processes will lack public trust and confidence and thus crumble. But while this is common sense – if not a “banal truism”,⁵⁴ as one interviewee put it – international peacebuilders still often grapple with implementing local ownership.⁵⁵ There are many reasons for this enduring gap between policy and practice. They range from persistent paternalistic attitudes among Western peacebuilders, who lack sensitivity to local perspectives and believe they “know best” about what people in conflict-affected societies really need to time pressures when taking urgent decisions to address immediate crises. Seemingly “paradoxical tensions” between local ownership, as well as other principles that guide international action but may not be shared by (all) local partners, such as enhancing gender equality, are a further reason.⁵⁶ One possible way forward that the experts debated during the workshop discussions and follow-up interviews would involve peacebuilding actors, when designing programs, investing more time and effort to qualify their concepts of local ownership and to understand the heterogeneity of “the local”.

They should be aware not only of divergent subnational dynamics in conflict-affected societies (> Spotlight 3.1), but also of colonial legacies and racism, gender discrimination, and other forms of inequality in these societies.⁵⁷ This knowledge is paramount to fully grasp and address how inequalities affect long-standing power relations and current institutional representation. This would not undermine guiding principles of local ownership, but ensure that programs do not inadvertently deepen existing inequalities or reinforce the silencing of marginalized groups.

“ In my personal experience of observing war, negotiating peace, and implementing peace, I always believe any grassroots initiative is likely to contribute to peace. I always believe that voices at the local level are so powerful. ”

Interview with Global Expert Group member Luka Biong Deng Kuol, 9 August 2023

In the workshop discussions and interviews many experts also came back to the question of **insights from previous cases of post-war reconstruction that could potentially provide guidance for rebuilding Ukraine**. The specific nature of Russia’s war on Ukraine – the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years – means there cannot be one cookie-cutter approach to different conflict settings. However, previous mistakes can be avoided and some knowledge gained from other cases, including the wars and subsequent reconstruction efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. This includes lessons about how to coordinate international efforts (> Spotlight 3.1) or how to help those who have experienced human rights violations, including torture or conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) (> Spotlight 3.2).

Another lesson from armed conflicts and wars across different world regions concerns the proliferation of arms and how their misuse, diversion and trafficking can impact human security. In Ukraine, immediately after Russia’s attack on 24 February 2022, a parliamentary emergency measure permitted the distribution of firearms to civilians in order to deter Russia’s offensive against Kyiv: “Given the urgency of the situation, many of the firearms were not properly registered, meaning the government does not have an accurate account of all weapons held by civilians”.⁵⁸ Because Ukrainians were aware of the Russian army’s record of violence against civilians, there was – and remains – an urgent need for protection and thus great demand for privately owned weapons. This is in line with previous experience: wars often create both the conditions and the need for acquiring arms outside state control. But weapons have a long service life and their proliferation often has dire

effects for human security long after a war has ended. In post-war societies, the availability of arms and enduring cultures of militarization increase the risks of crime, gender-based violence or new conflict.⁵⁹ Some experts in the workshop discussions also raised concerns that the arms delivered to Ukraine will end up in other conflicts around the world. Therefore, donors supporting Ukraine with weapons should take concrete steps now to strengthen tracing mechanisms and to limit risks of arms diversion and misuse. For example, they could assist the Ukrainian government to strengthen its security forces' capacity to account for and secure delivered weapons.⁶⁰

Spotlight 3.1:

/Rebuilding Ukraine: Some lessons from Kosovo



Donika Emini

The wars in Kosovo and Ukraine represent pivotal moments in the evolving international peace and security architecture. The case of Kosovo – which has time and again exposed substantial deficiencies in the prevalent international conflict resolution, peacebuilding and state-building approaches, endeavors that even so have endured for nearly three decades – unfolded during a period when liberal peacebuilding was the predominant international policy framework. The late 1990s were characterized by a unipolar world order, dominated by the United States and, to a lesser degree, the EU.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the geopolitical challenges to the current international order have severely impacted and reshaped existing peacebuilding paradigms and parameters. The Ukraine war has been detrimental to the already unstable international peacebuilding system driven by the UN. It has amplified the existing crisis and diminishing influence of liberal peacebuilding and interventionism, particularly within the domain of UN peacekeeping operations. The ambitions of actors such as China and Russia to establish alternatives to liberal peacebuilding, driven by the competition for influence across different regions, are concurrent developments. But despite these turbulent international waters, the efforts towards peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine have already taken off. In this regard, the case of Kosovo can serve as a solid toolbox and provide guidelines for Ukraine. Shortcomings regarding Kosovo can serve as lessons learned for Ukraine.

First, international efforts should be coordinated effectively among various actors and adhere to specified timelines. Both peacebuilding and peacekeeping processes must maintain clear objectives and operate within well-defined timeframes. Such a timely and well-coordinated approach is crucial in preventing extended processes that may result in significant overlaps among actors and confusion between international and domestic stakeholders.

Second, local ownership will be key to designing and structuring Ukraine's post-war reconstruction efforts. In efforts to design projects for Ukraine, one rule cannot and should not be undermined at any point: ensuring local ownership and that local voices are at the heart of the reconstruction process. While the context differed considerably from that of Ukraine, it is important to note that Kosovo was heavily governed by the international community, with executive powers ruling Kosovo internally and representing it in international fora. This will less

likely be the case with Ukraine, making its reconstruction less challenging.

Third, local specificities, in particular with regard to questions of history or ethnicity, need to be respected and fully understood by international actors. Simply put: one needs to understand the conflict before trying to build peace. Ukraine is a large country by territory, and not all sub-national regions have been equally impacted by the war. Different narratives and divisions between East and West are therefore unavoidable. Ethnicity, language and history must not be disregarded or ignored by international actors working in Ukraine. A fully inclusive dialogue is imperative for success.

Fourth, functional state structures and the decentralization of power are key components of post-war transformation. International efforts should include strengthening state institutions, improving governance, and ensuring transparency and accountability at all levels – especially during the post-war reconstruction period when large aid flows prevail. Adherence to the rule of law must remain a guiding principle, even when tensions escalate. Work must be carried out on two tracks in parallel: stability and the rule of law.

Finally, the case of Kosovo also shows that it is imperative to empower local non-state actors in peace processes. Ukrainians have shown a remarkable level of resilience and resistance. Working with independent civil society and media organizations will be key to shaping a future peacebuilding process. Urging civil society actors to take a more prominent role in this process will ensure a higher degree of inclusiveness. It also increases the chances that the process will consider the needs and aspirations of local communities.

Spotlight 3.2:

/Rebuilding Ukraine: Some lessons from Bosnia



Tatjana Milovanović



Velma Šarić

When we first started our work at the Post-Conflict Research Center in Sarajevo over 10 years ago, we advocated for programming on peace and genocide prevention. At the time, most civil society actors and the international community considered us “strange”, as we were advocating for the “prevention of violence”. We were told that this is not a pressing need, as our country Bosnia and Herzegovina was still undergoing a transition from war to peace. But Russia’s aggression against Ukraine reminded us all just how fragile peace is in all contexts in which historical grievances and traumatic pasts have not been resolved.⁶¹ It also reminded us how working on peace and the prevention of hatred and violence is a job and responsibility of all local actors, governments and the international community.

Now, almost 30 years after the war and genocide in Bosnia, and two years since the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, many parallels have been drawn between the two. Kyiv has come to mirror the besieged Sarajevo, and memories of the genocide committed in Srebrenica and the crimes in Prijedor, Višegrad, Foča, Central Bosnia and other areas have been reawakened in the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they witness how Russia is using similar methods of warfare, manipulation and denial in Ukraine as were used during and after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, there are also differences⁶² between Ukraine and Bosnia, not least because in 1992 the UN imposed an arms embargo that curtailed Bosnia’s ability to defend itself, while Ukraine has been receiving a wide range of diplomatic and military support since February 2022.

Bearing in mind that we are discussing two different conflicts and historical contexts, some important similarities are still evident, especially when looking at the position and vulnerability of civilians. Ukrainian prosecutors and other international organizations have noted the mounting evidence that Russian troops are using rape and sexual violence as part of their campaign of terror in Ukraine⁶³ – similar to the systematic use of rape by the Bosnian Serb army during the Bosnian war. In the aftermath of these crimes, it is crucial to provide free, long-term and universally accessible legal aid, as well as both health care and psychosocial support to victims, and also to make sure that investigations are in line with international standards, especially the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict. Reparations should be victim-centered and, in cases in which rape leads to pregnancy, the children should be guaranteed protection and support, much like their mothers.

An additional judicial challenge in Bosnia and the Western Balkans has been the lack of transparency and of trials in absentia when it comes to war crimes.⁶⁴ Judicially established facts must be made public without anonymization in order to link crimes explicitly to their perpetrators who committed them and the politico-military systems to which they belonged in order to avoid collectivizing crimes and attributing responsibility to an entire group. In Bosnia, the frequent practice of non-publication and anonymization of war crime verdicts negatively impacts the lives of survivors and relatives of victims. It is also detrimental to local communities, society and future generations. Such practices of non-publication and anonymization of war crime verdicts create the potential for convicted war criminals to occupy public and media space, and potentially even to hold public office. Because of the nature of the war, trials in absentia are expected in Ukraine, and while they can be a significant path to justice and moral reparations to victims one must also be wary of such practices,⁶⁵ as they can further deepen the culture of social impunity and mistrust in judicial systems, as well as open up a space for misinformation and distortion of judicial facts.

Finally, we are witnessing pro-Russian influence and sympathies among political factions in Bosnia and the region, who, proclaiming either support or neutrality, are placing themselves on the wrong side of history. Supporting Ukraine today is not a philosophical question or idea, but an obligation for all who believe in justice, equality, tolerance and peace.⁶⁶ Support for Ukraine is support for all victims and survivors who have felt and continue to experience injustice, crimes and genocide, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Rwanda, from Syria to Yemen, and many other places.

/04

Peacebuilding in a changing global order

Moving forward, what new realities confront international peacebuilding in the context of a changing global order? In order to address justified global perceptions of and frustrations with Western double standards, as well as the enduring structural inequalities of the multilateral system, it is time to rethink and redo international cooperation.

Key findings and ways forward

1. Facing new dilemmas and realities:

It is not only record-high global military expenditure, eroding arms control frameworks, technological advances in warfare or the rise of “new” actors – such as China – that will affect the future of international peacebuilding. Global frustrations with Western countries’ double standards in dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine compared with their approach to other conflicts across the globe – evident in both the unequal treatment of refugees and the disparate application of rules for conflict resolution – will be a new reference point for old doubts about international peacebuilders’ legitimacy and credibility. Rebuilding this legitimacy and credibility will depend on how coherent and consistent policies are going forward. This will require greater transparency from European policymakers and more honest communication with their partners on what interests their policies serve and the geostrategic reasoning they are rooted in.

2. Redoing international cooperation:

Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West’s response to it have also revealed anew the wariness of many countries of the Global South regarding the inefficiency, inequalities and lack of representation in multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF or WTO. Addressing these disparities and building more equal and mutually beneficial global partnerships are interests shared by many countries of the Global South and the West. Decisions taken in multilateral institutions impact the lives of people all over the world. Only if these institutions become more reflective of the interests and realities of the entire world will countries of the Global South also work to preserve them. European governments should use their influence as major donors to push for reforms of multilateral institutions to make them fit to address the global challenges of our time, for example, by giving countries of the Global South a more effective voice and equal representation.

/Facing new dilemmas and realities

Russia attacked Ukraine amidst a long-growing crisis of the liberal international order. This crisis is reflected in global power shifts, an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, declining collaboration in multilateral institutions, or questions increasingly being raised by many outside the West about “whose order” these institutions represent.⁶⁷ Against this background, **international peacebuilding and conflict resolution will need to confront several new dilemmas and realities going forward.** At a time when the global repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine have underlined the world’s interdependence and shared challenges, which individual states are ever less able to tackle alone, multilateral compromise and joint action on even the most pressing global crises have become increasingly impossible. At a time when funding gaps for tackling non-traditional threats to human security – including climate change – were already growing, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has reinforced this trend and added to rationales for increased military spending around the world, spending that reached a global record-high in 2022 (> Spotlight 4.1).

At a time when old global and regional arms control frameworks have eroded, and fears of nuclear escalation between major powers have returned to public and political discourse, technological advances have given rise to new weapons and means of warfare.⁶⁸ And at a moment in which Western-led peacebuilding was already in crisis, “new” actors – chiefly China, but also Brazil, Turkey or the Gulf states – are becoming ever more active in the field and will affect the future trajectory of peacebuilding more and more. China, for instance, is today among the top ten contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, provides substantial aid to conflict-affected states via its Belt and Road Initiative, and, in early 2023, released a twelve-point “Peace Plan” for Ukraine. This roadmap was interpreted by many not as a serious proposal for ending Russia’s aggression against its neighbor, but as a strategic foreign policy tool that China can use to present itself to countries of the Global South as a future player for peace.⁶⁹ Because China prioritizes different peacebuilding practices from Western actors in the field, emphasizing infrastructure development and poverty-reduction instead of promoting democracy and human rights, Western policymakers have watched China’s rise as a peacebuilder with much unease. But experts also point out that Western policymakers who frame China’s engagement in African conflict-affected states as a “new scramble for Africa”, while portraying the activities of the EU and its Member States on the continent as “values-based” and on a “higher moral ground” are overlooking the realities in conflict-affected countries.⁷⁰

In 2012, the UNGA adopted resolution 66/290, calling for a human security approach in tackling interconnected challenges to people's survival, dignity and development. This shifted the spotlight from state-centered to people-centered security. This adoption of a human security paradigm was a testament to the changing landscape of armed conflicts. The end of the Cold War seemingly signified the end of conventional war between states, and intra-state tensions, triggered largely by the combined effects of poverty, globalization and desires for political self-determination, have dominated global conflict dynamics. The human security approach also fit perfectly with the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2015. Guided by 17 SDGs and their 169 targets, states began recalibrating strategic policies on security and development, and alongside them the remodeling of programs, plans and operational mechanisms.

But while the world was busy pursuing SDGs and promoting human security, realist states began their maneuvers. Many examples could be presented here, but this "Spotlight" focuses on China and how the country is using its military might to trump the rule of law in the South China Sea. In 1994, China occupied the Mischief Reef, an island 129 nautical miles or 239 km from the Philippines. This signaled the beginning of China's military build-up in the contested waters of the South China Sea. China now "has fully militarized at least three of several islands ... arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets in an increasingly aggressive move that threatens all nations operating nearby."⁷¹ The military build-ups on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross are meant to strengthen China's control and expand its offensive capability in the South China Sea.

Other claimant states – the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – base their claims on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They have been engaged diplomatically to forge a binding South China Sea Code of Conduct. Negotiations on the Code of Conduct, in which China also participates, started as early as the 1990s but have not been finalized. The disputes in the South China Sea remain a major security threat for Southeast Asia. China's assertion of its claim has heightened tensions in the region, and likewise threatens the freedom of navigation in the area through which in 2016 an estimated 3.37 trillion US dollars or 21 per cent of all global trade passed.⁷²

Spotlight 4.1:

/“Might makes right”: China and the South China Sea



Jennifer Santiago Oreta

Given the reach of China's economic power, the states involved in the dispute have adopted the twin approaches of diplomacy and economic pragmatism. But the main casualties of this high-level politicking are the fisherfolk in claimant countries, whose livelihoods are directly affected by China's aggressive stance and the ambiguity of the claimant states' agenda on maritime security. China's unilateral nine-dash line – now updated to a ten-dash line⁷³ – very clearly demonstrates the return of the “might makes right” principle in the region and in international relations. The state and state-centered security are back in the global public discourse, this time armed with more technologically advanced weapons systems than before. While the centrality of the state in security discourse is not new, the arena in which it is staging a comeback has become ever more complex and fragile. The capacity of multilateral institutions to manage international affairs and mitigate both interstate and intrastate conflicts is in serious disarray. This will greatly challenge the future of peacebuilding in both the domestic and the international arena.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a new reality that international peacebuilding will need to confront is the **global frustration with Western countries' double standards in international affairs and the consequences of such frustration for Western peacebuilders' legitimacy and credibility**. Of course, such wariness about double standards is far from new. For instance, human rights organizations have repeatedly emphasized the stark discrepancy between the EU's human rights rhetoric in its foreign policy, on one hand, and its own migration cooperation with states such as Libya, where refugees are subject to inhuman conditions in detention centers, including torture and unlawful killings, on the other. After Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022, comparisons between that and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq (after presenting false evidence of weapons of mass destruction before the UNSC) were also repeatedly drawn as an example of double standards. And across the globe, many also listened with skepticism to Western policymakers' calls for international solidarity with Ukraine, remembering these same policymakers' decision “to hoard vaccines rather than waive intellectual property rights” during the global fight against the Covid-19 pandemic not so long ago.⁷⁴ There are many more examples of double standards to be drawn on.

Doubts about Western peacebuilders' legitimacy or credibility are not new either. Both legitimacy and credibility are powerful currencies in peacebuilding, in the sense that they ensure that peacebuilders' authority is accepted, as well as that they are trusted by local partners to follow through with their commitments. Legitimacy and credibility have many sources, such as peacebuilders' perceived neutrality, impartiality or reliability; their good track record or established expertise; and their status as a good role model. In the workshop discussions and follow-up interviews, many experts emphasized for instance that one

of the key reasons for Western peacebuilders' waning legitimacy from the standpoint of conflict-affected societies has been the ongoing crisis of democracy in the United States and Europe, where democratic norms have been eroding for years and far-right political parties with racist, sexist and nationalist platforms have gained ground in and even won elections. In addition, as one participant put it bluntly during a workshop, criminalizing the fundamental democratic right to engage in peaceful climate protest also damages the foreign policy credibility of democracies such as Germany seen from abroad.

In future, Russia's war on Ukraine and globally perceived Western double standards in dealing with it in contrast to other crises and conflicts will be taken as new reference points for doubts about the legitimacy and credibility of Western peacebuilders. In the workshop discussions and follow-up interviews, experts overwhelmingly pointed out and agreed overall on two aspects in particular. The first concerns the unequal treatment of refugees coming to Europe from Ukraine and from other regions, which according to some amounts to a "racialised refugee hierarchy" within Europe.⁷⁵ In interviews, this issue was repeatedly emphasized by experts without being asked about it explicitly.⁷⁶ They often stressed that in many conflict-affected countries, people are very familiar with forced displacement. From this perspective, the EU and its Member States' robust response to Ukrainians fleeing from war, particularly the EU's decision to activate the Temporary Protection Initiative for the first time to give Ukrainian refugees the right to temporary protection, is to be applauded. But many experts also emphasized that it is difficult to ignore how this response contrasts with the increasingly restrictive policies, violent pushbacks and ever more negative attitudes towards refugees from the Middle East and Africa who are arriving in Europe. Witnessing this stark discrepancy in both sympathy and policy, as one interviewee put it, was "quite powerful"⁷⁷ and stirred both public and political discourse about "whose lives matter" and who is deserving of sympathy and help in need in many countries.⁷⁸ As one interviewee summarized, there is a strong perception in many African countries that in Europe "Ukrainians receive a warm welcome with open arms, while Africans receive only cold shoulders".⁷⁹

The second aspect a large number of experts in the workshop discussions and interviews brought up is the standard toolbox for ending wars and building peace. Again, from the perspective of many conflict-affected societies, the swift response of the EU and its Member States following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the profound political and military support they have provided to Ukraine, as well as the position adopted by European policymakers, including German chancellor Olaf Scholz, that Ukraine alone shall decide whether it wants to enter negotiations with Russia deserves praise. It is perhaps, as one expert put it, already a "lesson learned" from previous wars such as Bosnia,

which did not receive military assistance but was subject to an arms embargo that only strengthened the Serbian advantage.⁸⁰ But many experts repeatedly pointed out in the discussions that it is again hard to ignore how fundamentally different Europe's response to the war in Ukraine is from its responses to violence in other regions: "It was seen as Europe asking its African partners to condemn an unjustified war of aggression simply because of its nearness to the EU's own borders", when other wars and atrocities do not see the same level of outrage or solidarity.⁸¹ For countries that have also experienced war, such as Yemen or Ethiopia, witnessing continued military assistance to Ukraine and hearing European policymakers stating that "this war will not come to an end until Europe wins",⁸² stands in stark contrast to the lectures they have heard in the past that there are "no military solutions" to conflict and that any conflict is best solved in negotiations.⁸³ This encourages voices in conflict-affected societies around the world asking, as one interviewee put it: "Why is it one rule for them and one rule for us?"⁸⁴

Taken together, the global perception of Western countries' double standards, evident in the unequal treatment of refugees and the disparate application of rules for conflict resolution, have added tension to already strained political relationships and have done great damage to peacebuilders' reputation.⁸⁵ Double standards – while sometimes plausible and rooted in geostrategic reasoning – may thus be self-defeating. For policymakers in Europe, rebuilding legitimacy and credibility as peacebuilders will depend fundamentally on how coherent and consistent their foreign policies are perceived to be all over the world. Greater transparency and more honest communication with partners will be needed with regard to what interests these policies serve and what geostrategic reasoning they are rooted in.

“[When it comes to double standards], there are several factors to consider. One is the perception that there are wars that matter more than others. And not only in terms of the reaction, but also how it has been normalized that violence and war happen in certain geographies and not in others. And that war in Europe matters more than when you have other wars in other places.”

Interview with Global Expert Group member Viviana García Pinzón, 4 August 2023

/Redoing international cooperation

Besides the increasingly vocal frustration of many countries in the Global South concerning Western double standards in international affairs, Russia's war on Ukraine has also again highlighted these countries' wariness of the inefficiency of multilateral institutions such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Trade Organization (WTO) in implementing issues such as financial reforms or policies to advance climate justice. They are also concerned about their lack of representation and equal influence over decision-making processes in these institutions, as well as the colonial legacies that still shape the current global political order. Decisions taken in these institutions impact the lives of people all over the world, and many countries of the Global South have problematized and pushed for reform of existing inequalities for years, if not decades. This only exacerbates the credibility crisis of multilateral institutions in all areas where action is strongly required. As South African president Cyril Ramaphosa put it at the annual BRICS summit in August 2023, the world's realities "call for a fundamental reform of the institutions of global governance so that they may be more representative and better able to respond to the challenges that confront humanity".⁸⁶ In addition to the challenges faced by multilateral institutions, countries such as Brazil and South Africa have demonstrated greater global ambition or sought a new foreign policy role in relation to Russia's war on Ukraine. Initiatives launched by several countries of the Global South on peacemaking in Europe – perhaps the first proposals of their kind ever – such as Brazil's urging for a negotiated settlement to the war or the initiative led by seven African presidents in June 2023 represent a new reality that European policy-makers, some have argued, will need to get used to.⁸⁷

These interlinked developments provide an opportunity to rethink what international cooperation for peace and security may look like in the future. Such cooperation would not be based on lecturing or "Westspaining" values to others or on urging countries to choose sides within the framework of dichotomous understandings of the global order. It would instead address neo-colonial power dynamics in current partnerships, take seriously the needs and priorities of countries of the Global South, and recognize their agency in a shifting world order.⁸⁸ Many countries of the Global South and the West share an interest in addressing the disparities of influence in the decision-making processes of multilateral institutions and working towards more equal and mutually beneficial global partnerships. This is because only if countries of the Global South gain more influence in multilateral institutions and the rules of the current global order change and become more reflective of the interests and realities of the entire

world will such countries work to preserve and commit to defend this order.⁸⁹ This requires action by European policymakers as well (> Spotlight 4.2). European governments should use their influence as major donors to push for reform of multilateral institutions to make them fit to address the global challenges of our time by giving countries of the Global South a more effective voice and equal representation.

“ I think it is the task of industrialized countries to show that just because Russia has attacked Ukraine and time and money are being spent on it, this does not mean that other things fall behind, but that the concerns of the Global South are taken into account and are supported both in terms of personnel and in terms of finances. ”

Interview with a diplomat, 25 October 2023

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the refusal of several major countries to unequivocally condemn Russia came as a shock to the Western world. At one level this implied that for much of the Global South the Ukraine war was just another conflict of a kind that receive hardly any attention when they occur outside the West. More generally, this also brought into focus the deep-seated problems afflicting the global order, and the growing discontent in the Global South. This, however, gives us an opportunity to examine some of the fundamental challenges confronting the contemporary global order and how to address them. International politics is unequal, and perhaps nothing may ever make it truly democratic and equal for all humanity. And yet, a stable, secure and prosperous world requires more equal and mutually beneficial partnerships – without them, large segments of humanity will continue to be discontented with the global order. While the Western world seeks to uphold the values of international law and global order, and is seeking partners for this purpose, recurring questions in the Global South include “whose order?” and “whose international law?”

The end of American unipolarity, the rise of countries such as China and India, the return of the Global South to the discourse, and the growing prominence of groupings such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are all indications that the new players on the global stage will not accept a continuation of the existing cooperation formats and assert their geopolitical agency more vigorously than ever. For those who have long been disempowered, this is their shot at change. However, this could potentially mean an end to the Euro-centric world order, and if the non-Western world’s concerns are not taken on board, it may lead to an unfortunate breakdown of contemporary global institutions with no alternatives in sight. In order to stabilize the current order and lend it more legitimacy and respect, a number of steps need to be taken.

What does an equal and mutually beneficial partnership might look like? From a Global South perspective, it would mean the growth of more consequential multilateral organizations beyond the institutions set up in the wake of the Second World War. It would mean a more empowered UNGA, a more inclusive UNSC, World Bank and IMF, and more results-oriented and meaningful consultations across various stakeholders on issues that affect humanity such as climate change, equitable terms of trade, or debt restructuring.

Spotlight 4.2:

/Towards more equal and mutually beneficial partnerships



Happymon Jacob

The change that I outlined above cannot come from below because the actors lower in the global pecking order can only demand change – which they have been doing for several decades now – but may not be able to effect it. So, change must come from the top. The P5 of the UNSC must immediately begin serious consultations on expanding UNSC to reflect the current global realities. The United States and its partners must also consider ways of making the World Bank and the IMF more inclusive, democratic and equitable. Equally important is the long-standing demand for technology transfer from the developed world to the developing part of the world for the purpose of climate change adjustment and more rapid development in the Global South. It is a shame that there has still been no patent waiver for Covid-19 vaccines. The choice is clear: we can either choose to repair the existing, but weakening global order or brace for a new world order whose contours are yet unknown.

List of abbreviations

BKHS.....	Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung
CAR.....	Central African Republic
CRSV.....	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
EPF.....	European Peace Facility
EU.....	European Union
EUMAM Ukraine...	European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine
FES.....	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
IMF.....	International Monetary Fund
LTTE.....	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MENA.....	Middle East and North Africa
NGOs.....	Non-governmental organizations
SCO.....	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDGs.....	Sustainable Development Goals
UN.....	United Nations
UNCLOS.....	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNGA.....	United Nations General Assembly
UNMISS.....	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSC.....	United Nations Security Council
WTO.....	World Trade Organization

Imprint

About BKHS

The Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung (BKHS) commemorates one of the most important German statesmen of the twentieth century. As a future-oriented think tank, it addresses issues that also interested Schmidt. Three overarching programmes are at the heart of the foundation's work programme: (i) European and International politics; (ii) global markets and social justice; and (iii) democracy and society. Closely meshed with these programmes, the permanent exhibition "Schmidt! Living Democracy" in Hamburg's city centre reflects almost half a century of German and international contemporary history. It puts the achievements of its namesake in current and historical context. In the Helmut Schmidt-Archiv in Hamburg's Langenhorn neighbourhood, the foundation makes the private documents of Schmidt and his wife Loki available to researchers and grants public access to the Schmidts' former home. The foundation was established in 2017 by the German Bundestag as one of seven non-partisan foundations commemorating politicians. It is supported by the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media.

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The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is a German political foundation that has acted as a partner to German foreign and developmental policy for decades. It focuses on the promotion of social justice, democracy, peace and security. Worldwide, FES aims to strengthen the forces of democracy, including the next generation of young politicians. In Europe, we work towards shaping the future of the European Union and fostering the acceptance of the European idea.

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policy. With its platforms for dialogue, publications and consultations, FES is making a contribution to globally informed political analysis, debate and action.

Published by

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Copy-editing and translations:

James Patterson, Anne Vonderstein, Simon Eckert

Illustrations and design: deerns und jungs
Designagentur Hamburg, www.duj-design.de

Printing: dynamik druck GmbH, Hamburg,
<https://www.dynamik-druck.de/>

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

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