The Politics of EU and African Migration Governance:

From Rhetoric to Practice

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The Politics of EU and African Migration Governance: From Rhetoric to Practice

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Abstract

Since the 'refugee crisis' crossed the frontiers of Europe, a common EU-African agenda of dealing with the challenges of migration has visibly gained in importance for policy stakeholders on the two continents. In 2015, more than 60 heads of states and government met in Valetta for the first summit between the EU and Africa solely dedicated to the topic of migration. In reality however, consultations go back at least a decade with common approaches addressed on a bilateral, regional and continental level. What can we learn from these approaches and how do they diverge from actual practices? This paper sketches out a comprehensive picture of the different policy approaches developed by the EU, EU-African and African institutions, by analysing over 100 policy documents on migration from the respective institutions and 100 European Trust Fund Projects. The paper shows that despite rhetorical similarities, interests divert, especially when it comes to how to address migration. Moreover, when it comes to the EU-practice a clear prioritisation of returns and migration management tools can be seen, which in parts contradicts their rhetoric calling for legal migration. Taken together, the interests of the EU and African institutions are diverging – and perhaps increasingly so – and the rhetoric does not always match up with the practice. At worst, this risks further fragmenting a thus-far incoherent approach on migration.

I.   Introduction

Though the development of common approaches to migration between African countries and the EU go back a long time, with numerous bilateral, regional and continental frameworks and policies, the topic is facing renewed attention. Not least since the so-called 'refugee crisis' crossed the frontiers of Europe – more accurately the 'European asylum policy crisis' (see Bendel, 2017) - a common EU-African agenda of dealing with the challenges of migration has visibly gained in importance. In 2015, more than 60 heads of states and government met in Valetta for the first summit between the EU and African partners solely dedicated to the topic of migration. Since then further events have confirmed this area as one of the most important policy issues on the joint agenda. With the 5th EU-Africa Summit scheduled to take place in Abidjan at the end of November 2017 and Merkel's promise to dedicate her G20 presidency to building a new partnership compact with Africa, hardly a day goes past without a news item on the EU working on their relationship with African states. Migration continues to be at the centre of the debate, not surprising considering the drastic humanitarian consequences of the large number of (largely African) migrants taking the Mediterranean route to Europe – over 2,700 of whom have died in 2017 alone.[2]

Nonetheless, the common approach the EU has developed towards migration in general and Africa in particular, further illustrated below, has been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, the development of migration policies is partial at best, if not outright exclusionary. Take the Valetta summit – all the European member states were invited as well as European agencies like EUROPOL, FRONTEX and the President of the European Parliament at the time, Martin Schulz. Only 35 African states were however invited and attended – namely those that were already a party or observer to the regional Rabat or Khartoum process (for more on this see below). Countries hosting significant refugee populations and well versed in migration challenges like South Africa (with 1, 217 788 'population of concern' in 2015[3]) or Uganda (694, 158 in 2015) were not invited. The exclusion also included important civil society stakeholders (IRIN, 2015). Other EU instruments like the European Trust Fund have also been criticised for their exclusionary nature (Castillejo, 2016). Secondly, and as a direct consequence of this, critics argue that European migration policies and their implementation favour European interests to the detriment of their African partners (e.g. Koch, Knoll and Mawowa, 2015; Koch, 2017). Thirdly, the EU policy on migration with Africa has been criticised as being incoherent, not least because much of the decision-making rests with the individual member states (FES and CCPAU, 2016). In fact, a lot happens on a bilateral

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[2] See https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean
[3] This number includes including refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR and is the most recent data, which is from 2015.

level – with different member states making agreements with individual African partner states such as between Spain and Senegal or Gambia (see Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016).

Does this critique – often voiced by civil society stakeholders – hold true? Is there in fact an uneven relationship between the EU and African partners when it comes to migration, in favour of European interests? Policy makers and academics also tend to focus on analysing the European side of the partnership in migration, in line with the Eurocentric research bias more generally (see Flahaux and De Haas, 2016). Therefore, a research gap exists in not only in understanding if the interests between the two sides diverge, but also what these interests actually are. This paper aims to comprehensively map the interests from the EU and African stakeholders when it comes to defining understanding and addressing migration and to see how these policies are implemented in practice. Such an undertaking is of course limited by the fact that oftentimes lengthy negotiations lie behind the documents being analysed, and what matters just as much is what wordings have been excluded. Moreover, the types of documents hold different political weight. Certainly, statements from the AU Executive Council holds less clout than a mobility partnership between the EU and Cap Verde. Nonetheless, for the sake of unpacking the way migration is understood and conceptualised in the different institutions, such hierarchical blindness is methodologically feasible.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in a first section some of the major literature in migration and refugee studies is outlined, arguing for a comprehensive approach to studying policies on migration in Africa and the EU as well as between the two continents. The policy frameworks of migration governance are then illustrated. In the main part of the paper, the rhetoric of the EU and African institutions on migration is analysed using over 100 documents including policy frameworks, declarations, action plans and conventions. This is followed by a review of the actual practice of migration governance, in particular by looking at the European Trust Fund. In a final section, the paper concludes arguing that there is in fact a divergence between the European and African actors when it comes to addressing migration. Though there are consistent rhetorical approaches for needing to address human trafficking, better data and policy harmonisation and better forms of legal migration, that's where the similarities end. Rhetorically the two regions differ when it comes to the protection of refugees and displaced people and where the root causes of migration lie. They also have nuances in understanding mobility and the migration-development nexus. A de facto emphasis in practice on the securitization of migration management and treating migration as primarily poverty-incited increasingly diverts the EU approach from African frameworks geared towards mobility and legal migration. The risk is that if the EU focuses so much on empty rhetoric that their policies only add to further incoherence of their migration strategy.

II.   A comprehensive approach to studying migration

Research on migration and refugees are as broad as they are encompassing spanning fields of economy, development studies, political science and anthropology to name just a few. Research on migration policies in Africa tends to be geographically limited to particular areas of Africa such as the Sahel zone (Brachet, 2010), West Africa (Konseiga, 2005) or the Great Lakes Region (Bakewell and Bonfiglio, 2013). When research does consider the relationship between the EU and Africa, it focuses either on one of the RECs or the AU more generally. For examples, studies have considered individual EU instruments in Africa such as mobility partnerships or the Centre for Migration Information and Management in Mali (Angenendt, 2014; Rich, 2010 respectively). Moreover, scholars tend to focus on labour migration or the complexities of hosting refugees as mutually exclusive. Most of the work on EU-African relations in terms of migration more generally tend to be policy-orientated commentaries with a few older exceptions (Mangala, 2013; Welz, 2015).

In terms of migration within Africa, the literature repeatedly highlights the fact that most migration is inner-African or in more general terms 'South-South', though this is not reflected in the abundance of literature on the topic, which largely focuses on 'South-North' migration (e.g. Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Welz, 2015). Studies on migration in Africa tends to be on mobility and borders, significance and solutions for displaced people and the complex relationship between migration and development. Policy recommendations repeatedly highlight the necessity for legal migration (e.g. Koch, Knoll and Mawowa, 2015). Mobility is a major emphasis when discussing migration in Africa as well as the complexities of colonial borders, which despite their often porous nature, continues to shape livelihoods and movements (Konseiga, 2005; Adepoju, 2011; Bakewell, 2016). This is not only relevant in terms of circular work migration (especially in West Africa), but is also a significant safety valve in regions like the Horn of Africa, where the culture of mobility offers entire population a lifeline in times of conflict and disorder (Reitano, 2016). In terms of patterns and solutions for displaced persons and refugee flows, research largely focuses on the complexities in particular for protracted displacement and the strains for host-states (Rwamatwara, 2005; Fresia, 2014) and the triad of repatriation, resettlement and (local) integration (Hovil, 2007; Hammond, 2014; Long, 2014). Much migration literature considers the nexus between development and migration, which is as contested as much as it is frequently evoked. It is widely acknowledged that on the whole remittances exceed the value of overseas development funds, and thus has a potential impact on development, however the social and human costs can offset this (Giovannetti and Lanati, 2016). Scholars continue to argue whether more development will lead to less migration or will in fact increase opportunities to migrate (the latter being widely accepted by now, see for example Clemens, 2014). Does migration lead to negative effects of the 'brain-drain' of highly-skilled workers (by

now disputed amongst economists, see Rapoport, 2016) or is this out-weighed by the effects of remittances? Either way, the diaspora are increasingly seen as ideal partner to incorporate not only financially but also intellectually (Newland and Patrick, 2004; Giovannetti and Lanati, 2016). The relationship between migration and development is in all likelihood circular and highly complex, incorporating both positive and negative impacts (e.g. Clemens, 2014; De Haas, 2010). Unsurprisingly, with different assumptions on the link between development and migration, policy instruments are not always coherent in what they wish to achieve (Castillejo, 2016).

Studies on migration in the EU (and from Africa) on the other hand tend to focus on irregular migration and securitization debates. The discourse on migration within a securitization framework stems from the belief that migration may infringe on public order and consequently state sovereignty. In the EU there is a tendency to conflate crime and terrorism with migratory movements (DeVargas and Donzelli, 2014). The securitization of EU policies on migration has a long history going back to the 1980s, and threats are perceived ones, not actual ones (e.g. Huysmans, 2000; Faist, 2005). This leads to the situation whereby though emigration is an inalienable right, immigration remains under the control of sovereign states. Moreover, the securitized approach to migration from outside Europe juxtaposes the ideals of inclusion (through the Schengen Agreement) with those of exclusion. In effect, this means that there is a focus on externalising border and migration controls to countries of origin and transit in Africa (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero and Aragall, 2009; Mangala, 2013). Increased FRONTEX operational powers (Andersson, 2016; Léonard, 2010) and talk of 'fighting' and 'combatting' illegal migration, through intensifying border controls and cracking down on human trafficking and smuggling (Haas, 2008) are symptoms of this securitized approach. According to analysts of the securitised approach, the EU also predominantly uses the term 'illegal' migration, instead of the less pejorative 'irregular' (Walters, 2010). There has however been a rhetorical distancing away from such a securitized vision, towards a more preventative 'root cause approach', which seeks to reduce push factors for migration (Mangala, 2013; see also Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero and Aragall, 2009; Carling and Talleraas, 2016). More generally, in reaction to this European securitized vision of migration as a potential security threat to control, Mangala argues that African policies tend to be reactive by reiterating the human rights of migrant populations (2013).

From this we can already draw out a number of questions for the rhetoric analysis: how is migration understood in relation to mobility, development and security in the respective institutions? Is the focus on refugees or irregular migrants, in Africa or beyond? Does this mean that the EU perspective tends to be more negative with migration seen as a problem and the African perspectives sees migration as something positive to be properly harnessed?

In terms of rhetoric of migration more broadly, since migration flows tend to increasingly be mixed – consisting of both migrants and potential asylum seekers – a differentiation between the two has become increasingly difficult. At the very least in terms of the dangerous journey, the risks are the same and a differentiation becomes superfluous. Moreover the actual motivation to migrate is often mixed and on a continuum between voluntariness and involuntariness rather than a dichotomy (Carling and Talleraas, 2016). How this is picked up in the rhetoric from Africa and the EU will also be considered below.[4]

Research on effectiveness of migration policies tends to confuse policies on paper and their implementation, which Czaika and de Haas name the 'implementation gap' (2013). In order to avoid such a conflation this paper will consider the migration policies in Africa and the EU in terms of the rhetoric on paper as well as their de facto implementation. Moreover, there is a distinct research gap to comprehensively approach migration using a spectrum of both forced and voluntarily forms of migration. A thematic comprehensiveness is further advanced through a transregional perspective, that recognises the multiple levels of migration governance (Betts, 2016) across and between the different regions. It therefore makes sense to look at different types of frameworks within Africa and EU, despite their institutional differences. An overview of these different policy frameworks follows next.

III.   Migration Policy Frameworks in Africa and Europe

When it comes to the protection of displaced people, the AU and its predecessor the Organisation of African Union (OAU) can be considered as pioneers in the field. With the background of an increasing number of refugees in the 1960s with the decolonialisation movements at the time, a 1969 Convention was signed by the OAU, coming into force in 1974. Herewith prima facie refugee protection is ensured to entire communities rather than having to go through individualised asylum claims (Okello, 2014). In 2009, the first ever convention on the protection of internally displaced people was signed in Kampala, coming into force in 2012. In addition to the protection regime it offers, it also calls for accountability for international corporations and armed groups that cause mass flight. Causes for displacement include armed conflict, environmental catastrophes and climate change.

Beyond this, calls for a continental free movement of persons are increasing, a declaration on migration enshrines the idea (2015) and an AU Assembly decision from 2016 sets the stage for African passports, currently scheduled for a launch by 2020. Moreover, after initial efforts by the OAU to develop a migration strategy in 2001, an AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa was adopted by the Executive Council in

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[4] For the purposes of this paper, in order to acknowledge this conceptual complexity, I will refer to migrants and migration when speaking about people on the move – both forcibly and voluntarily – which includes refugees and asylum seekers. When a distinction is necessary (i.e. refugees are protected under international law) the term refugee is used. In other words, all refugees are migrants, but not all migrants are refugees.

2006. In conjunction with the 'African Common Position on Migration and Development', the two papers conceptualise migration as 'multifaceted and complex' and provide guidelines for governments in the formulation of migration policies. Much of the work on migration is however relegated to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

At the forefront comes ECOWAS, who have enshrined freedom of movement – including the right of entry, establishment and residency in a series of protocols since 1979. A memorandum on refugees from 2007 gives refugees the right of residence, establishment and work in other ECOWAS countries, albeit on the basis that they are ECOWAS citizens. A document from 2008, also establishes a common approach in the ECOWAS region to migration, seeking to initiate a 'strategic thinking process' for defining a regional approach to migration. There is no overall regional policy framework to govern migration, including labour migration, in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), though some bilateral agreements exist. Similarly, the East African Community (EAC) has no specific protocols on migration, though the free movement of persons is guaranteed in the Treaty (Article 104 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community). Lastly, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has also developed a regional migration policy framework. Compared to other RECs, the IGAD's approach is quite comprehensive with a Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF) adopted in 2012 stemming from a regional consultative process on migration first established in 2008. An AU Horn of Africa Initiative was launched in 2014 to respond to human trafficking and people smuggling on the continent.

On the European side, an overarching framework for the external migration and asylum policy of the EU was launched in 2005 and further clarified in 2011. This Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) follows four objectives (of equal importance): managing legal migration; preventing and combatting irregular migration; maximising the development impact of migration and promoting international protection. As part of the Africa-EU partnership, the EU-Africa Summits of heads of states and government, which take place every 3 years, have also informed migration policy. At the 2nd Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon (2007) the partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment was launched, as part of bigger move from donorship to partnership. Two summits later, at the 4th the EU-Africa Summit in 2014 in Brussels, a new impetus was given to the cooperation on migration. In addition to a declaration on migration and mobility, a revamp of the partnership on migration, mobility and employment, and an action plan on migration and mobility (2014-2017) was adopted. The Valetta Summit, the first high-level summit dedicated solely to migration (see above), led to a political declaration, action plan and the launch of a trust fund (more on this below). Most of the European policy making on migration with Africa however takes place on a regional and bilateral level, for an overview see Figure 1 below.

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Regionally, the strongest instrument is the Rabat process, launched in 2006, which offers space for an operational partnership on migration between the EU, its Member States as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland with African countries along migration routes from and via North, West and Central Africa, a total of 16 countries (plus Algeria who have an observer status). The Rabat process is reviewed at regular Euro-African Ministerial Conferences on Migration and Development, including in Rabat (2006), Paris (2008), Dakar (2011) and Rome (2014). The overall aim of this non-binding and voluntary process is broadly aligned to the GAMM objectives. The Khartoum Process was launched in 2014, anchored in the EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 2014-2017(see above), and primarily aims to tackle human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants in countries of origin and transit in the Horn of Africa. It has been criticised for co-opting the longer-running AU Horn of Africa Initiative, which had been formalised just five months beforehand.

Figure 1: Overview of Migration Governance in Africa and Europe

A last regional approach towards migration is the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) - EU dialogue, with a Joint Declaration on migration and development adopted in June 2010. The ACP-EU Council committed themselves to strengthen and deepen their dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, building on three pillars, migration and development, legal migration and illegal migration. With initial negotiations currently starting in light of a new agreement needed for 2020, migration is set to take on a more prominent role.

Bilateral instruments form the strongest commitment to joint migration governance and several instruments exist (beyond bilateral agreements between individual EU and AU member states). Firstly, mobility partnerships are conceived as the main comprehensive and long-term bilateral framework for

facilitating policy dialogue and operational cooperation on migration management with third countries. The European Commission proposed this instrument in 2007 as a way to introduce legal migration into EU cooperation with partner countries, offering mobility and legal migration opportunities, including circular migration projects, *in return* for their cooperation on preventing irregular immigration, increasing border management and accepting readmission commitments. Such mobility partnership exists in Africa with Cap Verde (2008), Morocco (2013) and Tunisia (2014). They have been criticised for their limited added value with regard to facilitating legal migration opportunities for citizens from the partner countries (Angenendt, 2014). Less commitment can be expressed through Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility, which can signal a wish to advance cooperation on migration in the long-run. Only three of these exist worldwide, two of which are in Africa, namely with Nigeria (2015) and Ethiopia (signed at the Valetta Summit, 2015).

With the aim of fully integrating migration into the EUs foreign policy, the Migration Partnership Framework was launched in June 2016. The idea is to reach compacts with partner states, in order to 'better manage migration in full respect of humanitarian and human rights obligations' (European Commission, 2016). Such compacts will combine migration policies with other areas of competence of the EU including development aid, trade, energy and security with both short and long-term aims. The framework has been criticised for its carrot and stick approach, boldly stating in the explanatory notes that '…without shying away from *negative incentives*, EU assistance and policies should be tailored to produce concrete results in stemming the flow of irregular migrants' (emphasis added European Commission, 2016). High-level dialogue has been conducted with 11 African countries with Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, and Ethiopia as priority countries for partnership compacts. Having given a broad overview of the different global, regional and bilateral instruments, the next section of the paper looks at the rhetoric in the different documents.

IV.   The Rhetoric of Migration

In the following, the rhetoric of EU and African approaches towards migration will be illustrated through a content-analysis (run using Max QDA) of 109 documents relating to migration from the EU and Africa at a global, regional and bilateral level between 2005 and 2016 (see Appendix A). The starting date of the observation period is tied to the European GAMM, which was initially launched in 2005 and ends in 2016 when the new Partnership Framework was launched. During this time period I searched for all documents related to migration using a snow-ball principle. [5] There were 65 African documents with 19 and 25

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[5] EU documents related to the internal regulations of asylum politics (i.e. Dublin Regulations) as well as repatriation (i.e. the 2015 EU Action Plan on Return) were however not included, as this went beyond the scope of this paper. In

documents from the EU and EU-African relations respectively. It should be noted however, that the EU-African documents are still primarily under EU penmanship, though they emphasize 'partnership' almost obsessively, with the term appearing on average 22.5 times per EU-African document compared to 7.8 in EU ones and 1.6 times in African documents, see Table 3 below. Most of the documents have global approaches, especially the African ones.[6]

The rhetoric of the policy documents will be analysed in terms of a) the definition of migration; b) the understanding of migration and c) how to address migration as previously introduced. The content analysis considered specific areas of migration research (e.g. development, securitization, mobility), but left space for further considerations, that had thus far not been included in the literature.[7] As I will show in the following, the rhetoric is surprisingly similar when it comes to defining migration, though differences appear when it comes to understanding migration and even more so in terms of addressing the phenomena.

<u>Defining Migration</u>

Despite the increasing attention to the reductive nature of artificially separating migrants from refugees, the term 'mixed migration' is used infrequently, appearing on average 0.3 times in the African documents, compared to 0.2 times in each of the EU-African documents and only 0.05 times in the EU documents (see Table 1 below).

All of the documents mention migrants, returnees, asylum-seekers, refugees and displaced people, though the latter two are preponderant in African documents. African documents mention displaced/displacement on average 12.2 times per document, compared to only 2.7 and 2.5 for EU-African and EU documents respectively. The use of the term refugees is more balanced, see Table 1. Therefore, in terms of who they address, displaced people are predominant in African documents, with the other terminologies more equally used.

Though the focus of African documents is more strongly on forced displacement, all approaches tend to include discussion on irregular migration. The preponderance for the term illegal in European policy documents (Walters, 2010) has changed however, as the documents show, with most now using irregular rather than illegal. In fact, as shown in Table 1, especially the EU documents limit their use of the term

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addition, only EU led bilateral agreements were included, as those with individual member states are difficult to obtain and are often secret.

[6] The Valetta documents are included in global documents though the approach does exclude some actors. On the other hand the general documents on the 2016 partnership framework introduce a global approach, but because they are implemented bilaterally, they are included under the bilateral approach.

[7] The documents were analysed quantitatively with frequency counts but most qualitatively. The coding system was deduced from the literature, and inductively revised after coding a smaller batch of documents in a first round.

illegal, in contrast to the EU-African documents. Additionally, though the African documents also refer to these terms, 'irregular' appears on average much less frequently, see Table 1. Therefore, European documents have rhetorically moved on from the term illegal, but European-led documents also frequent the term irregular more than their African counterparts.

Table 1: The average frequency** of certain terms in the policy documents when defining migration

	African documents (65 documents)	EU-African documents (25 documents)	EU only documents (19 documents)
mixed migration	0.3 (21)	0.2 (6)	0.05 (1)
displac*	12.2 (793)	2.7 (54)	2.5 (47)
refugees	5.2 (335)	3 (76)	4.7 (89)
illegal	1.7 (76)	4 (100)	0.3 (6)
irregular	2.5 (160)	6.1 (152)	6.6 (125)

*This allows for an open-end search that includes both displacement and displaced.
**In order to account for the discrepancy in the number of documents the table shows the average frequency for the term in each document with the actual number in brackets

Beyond this, the African documents tend to have quite elaborate definitions of migration, such as

> "movements could be legal or undocumented and encompass all social categories, including refugees, internally displaced persons, nomads migrating in search of pasturelands, young and women setting off from the country side in search of job opportunities in the city, employment seekers, and, increasingly, qualified persons, women and children under the age of 18" (1.2.2., see Appendix A)

or "migration, the search for safety, a better life, better climates, markets, goods to trade - is as old as humanity itself" (3.6.8). The comprehensive approach to defining migration is especially the case for the IGAD documents, which go to great lengths to differentiate between different forms of migration and also include tourism and statelessness in their expansive definition (e.g. 2.7.1.). One of the IGAD documents also recalls the 'complex migration environment' in the region, where 'where migrants 'switch' their identities between asylum seekers and economic migrants' (2.7.7). Though the EU-led GAMM concedes to the complexity of defining migration, stating that their approach "should … be migrant-centred. In essence, migration governance is not about 'flows', 'stocks' and 'routes', it is about people" (1.1.1), the African documents tend to display more complexities in their definitions.

In terms of the predominance of inner-African migration, the African documents reflect largely speak of migration within the continent, though some do acknowledge migration outside the continent and

interestingly increasingly to the Middle East (e.g. 1.2.2 or 2.7.2). In an AU statement made shortly after Valetta, the authors note 'it is important to note that the vast majority of African migrants still move within Africa and this dynamic has expanded significantly over the last decades' (3.6.5). The EU and EU-African documents also acknowledge this, stating for example 'inter- and intra-regional migration in developing regions far exceeds migration to the EU' (1.1.1) or 'acknowledging that migratory movements occur essentially within Africa…' (3.1.2). They do however still tend to focus on irregular migration towards Europe, or when they refer to migration within Africa, they always add the South-North dimension in addition. Thus, the previously cited document continues for example, '… and also towards developed countries' (3.1.2).

In conclusion therefore, the definition of migration is broadly similar, though on the whole more expansive for the African documents. The idea of mixed migration holds little resonance in all of the policy documents and the two regions emphasise their respective areas of interests. This is displaced people for African documents and irregular migration for European ones. This can be explained of course by the preponderance of displaced people on the African continent compared to Europe, but also highlights that the European and EU-African documents are largely focused on migrants other than refugees or displaced. The fact that European documents highlight the South-North dimension in their geographical focus is also understandable, especially since some of them note that this is just a fraction of the mobility movements. The next section considers how migration is understood in the documents beyond these initial definition.

Understanding Migration

The literature gives the idea that migration would be understood as something positive on the African continent (in addition to the challenges of protection displaced people) compared to the more negative view from Europe geared towards securitization. An initial analysis does not support this presumption. If we do a frequency count of 'positive', it appears on average twice in every EU-African documents compared to only 0.4 times in the African ones (and 1.1 times in the EU ones, see Table 2 below). This includes statements such as 'international migration has a positive effect on the host country and on the country of origin' (2.1.2). Inversely, 'problem' is mentioned on average 0.2 times in the EU-led documents, compared to 0.7 times in the African ones, see Table 2 below.

A deeper analysis of the understanding of migration can be carried out by looking at four areas – migration and mobility; the nexus between migration and development; migration and securitization and migration and human rights, which came out from the documents themselves.

Migration and mobility

A preliminary view of mobility shows that it is by no means disregarded in the European context – it appears on average 10.7 times in EU-African documents compared to the average of 2.7 times in the African documents (Table 2). If we take a closer look, two major findings are of interest. African documents tend to focus on mobility through the freedom of movement, whereby 'free movement…is a crucial element for deepening continental integration and unity in the spirit of Pan-Africanism' (1.4.6), with the ultimate aim of offering all Africans the same opportunities as citizens, at least in the regional economic communities (1.4.4). Mobility is described in terms of harmonization of educational standards and, as a first step towards African passports, easing up of visa requirements. Of note is that in the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration, there is a note that free movement within ECOWAS reduces migratory pressure beyond its boundaries (2.6.1). This is also highlighted in the EU-led documents who call for the support of intra-African mobility (3.1.2). In fact, these documents do refer to mobility – but mostly in conjunction with legal migration or as something to be (well) managed. Thus, mobility is to be facilitated 'on the basis of a well-managed rights-based approach to migration' (2.3.7). If we amend the frequency search for mobility AND legal within one sentence, only an average of 0.5 mentions is made per African document compared to 4.2 mentions in the EU-African documents (see Table 2, the results for mobility AND manage* are very similar). This finding does not hold true for the EU documents, which in any case make very few references to mobility. In sum, both African and EU-led documents prescribe to mobility as part of migration, but the African documents favour an understanding of mobility as the freedom of movement, and the EU-African ones as mobility that is legal and well-managed.

Table 2: The average frequency of certain terms in the policy documents when understanding migration

	African documents (65 documents)	EU-Africa documents (25 documents)	EU only documents (19 documents)
positive	0.4 (29)	2 (49)	1.1 (21)
problem	0.7 (48)	0.2 (6)	0.2 (4)
mobility	2.7 (173)	10.7 (267)	1.8 (35)
mobility AND legal	0.5 (35)	4.2 (104)	0.2 (4)
mobility AND manage*	0.5 (32)	4.1 (102)	0.4 (8)
fight* OR combat*	1.8 (116)	10.6 (265)	1.8 (35)
traffick* OR smuggl*	14.2 (923)	15.3 (383)	8.2 (156)
border management OR control	1.1 (73)	2.3 (58)	1.3 (24)
right* AND dignity	0.4 (24)	2.4 (60)	0.1 (2)

The migration-development nexus

Generally, both the EU-led and the African documents are open to the idea migration can be good for development. African documents notably refer to the 'untapped potential' [of migration in Africa] (1.2.1) or reiterate the role of 'migrants as agents of innovation and development' (3.6.7, the exact phrase previously making an appearance in the 2014 EU-Africa declaration on migration and mobility, 3.5.2). They are especially focused on how to better regulate and lower the costs for remittances (e.g. 2.7.7) and more generally labour rights (e.g. 3.6.6). More vaguely, a number of the EU-African documents mention the 'synergies' between development and migration (e.g. 2.1.3). The importance of remittances are also widely recognised by EU and EU-African documents (e.g. 4.3.2, 3.1.2). One of the ACP-EU Document takes this further, stating that 'better management of migrations may generate very important gains, perhaps more important than the removal of world trade barriers' (2.3.1). This strong statement does not appear elsewhere, and also reiterates a point made in all of the documents. Namely, there is an urgency for migration to be *well-managed* in order to reap the benefits for development, since it is the 'good governance of migration [that] will…bring vast development benefits' (1.1.1,).[8] Circular or legal forms of migration make rare appearances (e.g. 2.3.7), largely included in the Mobility Partnerships (e.g. 4.1.1). The potential negative consequences of migration are acknowledged by all types of documents, especially 'brain-drain', with only a ACP-EU Document reiterating the lack of consensus of the effect of 'brain-drain' and the exacerbation of the phenomena caused by North American and European policies for selective migration policies (2.3.2).

Beyond this, development is increasingly seen as a solution to *stop migration* in the EU-led documents. For example this is the approach used in the current Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which highlights the nexus between development and migration, aiming to 'normalise migration flows' though reducing poverty (2.3.2). Similarly, the European Agenda on Migration argues that development is needed to tackle 'global issues like poverty…unemployment which are among the root causes of irregular…migration (1.1.2) or the Rabat Declaration which states that 'concerted action on the root causes of migration [is required], in particular through the implementation of development projects in Africa' (2.1.2). A major way to address irregular migration therefore is through job creation, widely reiterated, especially for 'young people and women' (3.6.3). In addition, the documents call for encouraging private investments in the countries of origin (e.g. 4.3.1), promoting Foreign Direct Investment to 'generate employment and reduce migration outflow (3.1.2), capacity building in the health and education section (e.g. 3.1.2), social

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[8] On a side note, the Kampala Convention recognises displacement because of 'large-scale development projects' (2.2), thus highlighting a link between development and forced migration.

protection (3.4) and more recently the importance of resilience and strengthening livelihoods, which has become a core of the EU Trust Fund projects (see below, e.g. 3.5.4).

But it is not just the EU-African/EU documents that look at this side of the migration-development nexus, but African states also advocate development as a solution to stop a migration exodus (see also Haas, 2008). The AU Common Position on migration for example states that 'poverty is one of the main causes of migration. Creating development opportunities in countries of origin would mitigate the main reasons for young people to engage in migration, thereby also dealing with the problem of brain drain' (1.2.2). In sum therefore, the complexities of the relationship between migration and development are mirrored in all the documents. Nonetheless, they do differ with a slightly stronger emphasis in African documents on the development potential of migration and on using development to stop/ reduce irregular migration in the EU-led documents.

The migration-security nexus

As for the migration-security nexus, it is notable that in the European 2006 GAMM there is no mention of fighting or combatting migration. More generally, a resolution on skilled workers and its effect on national development by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly from 2007 also 'expresses concern at the current migration policies of the EC and EU Member states focused on security… rather than on development priorities' (2.3.1). This has changed when it comes to the EU Migration Agenda in 2015 (where fighting appears 5 times). In fact, if we search for fight* OR combat*, it appears an astounding average of 10.6 times in each EU-Africa documents compared to only 1.8 times for both the African and EU ones, see Table 2 above, showing a strong preponderance for securitized language in the EU-African documents.

Several themes can be highlighted in terms of securitization. First of all the documents all focus on potentially destabilizing impact of *unmanaged migration* on (national/regional/international) security (e.g. 3.6.5) and rhetorically highlight the *fight* against 'illegal' or 'irregular' migration is used (e.g. 1.2.1). Concrete actions that result from this are for example including migration in current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Mali and Niger (1.1.2) or more generally the aim of more coherence between security and migration policies (2.7.3). In addition, the documents mention a variation of border management techniques, mainly in terms of capacity building of border control on the African continent (e.g. 1.1.1). This has not been left uncriticised however. A statement by Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as Chairperson of the AU at the Valetta summit notes that, 'the problem that we are facing today is in part because some countries in Europe have taken a fortress approach', and that 'the African Union expresses concern about the militarization of its shores and airspace' (3.6.8). Nonetheless, for example the Rabat

Action Plan, notes that joint action may be possible with 'maritime, terrestrial and aerial cooperation, between countries of origin, transit and destination so as to dismantle the criminal organizations that control … trafficking' (2.1.1). Of course the latter is a regional process and not under the auspices of the AU, but it also shows that the easiest common denominator in a securitized approach is to tackle trafficking (and to a lesser degree smuggling). Security terms are most frequently used in relation to trafficking or smuggling, which is seen to violate national sovereignty and linked to smuggling of narcotics and contraband goods and weapons (e.g. 2.7.8, see also 1.1.2). The term trafficking or smuggling is used on average more than 15 times for each of the EU-African documents and over 14 times in each African document, see Table 2.

Thus, the securitized language is not the exclusive prerogative of the EU or EU-African processes, the African ones also speak to it. The question is always of course in a fundamentally unequal relationship how much of this stems from free political determination. It is still clear looking at the frequency counts that the EU-African documents contain a more securitized rhetoric than their exclusively African counterpart. For example border management or control is used on average 2.3 times for each of the EU-African documents compared to 1.1 times for the African ones, see Table 2 above. But, and this is somewhat surprising, the EU-led documents tend to have a less securitized language than the EU-African documents. This confirms the argument made by Mangala that at least from the Migration, Mobility and Employment Dialogue onwards, there was a rhetorical shift away from the security perspective (2013). Rhetorically, in these global and bilateral documents, the EU shies away from too much securitized language. The emphasis on securitization can also be garnered by considering how the documents seek to address migration (and the actual practice), which will be discussed further below.

The human rights of migrants

The human rights of migrants was a theme that became consistently apparent from the content analysis. The AU Common Position on migration states that the 'fight against illegal or irregular migration must be waged within the context of strict observance of human rights and human dignity' (1.2.2, but see also 2.1.3). If we search for right* AND dignity within one sentence however, it appears on average 2.4 times in the EU-African documents, compared to 0.4 times in the African documents (and only 0.1 times in the EU ones, c.f. Table 2). In fact, an almost identical phrase regarding the observation of human rights appears in the Rabat Three-Year Cooperation Programme (2.1.3), and all types of documents acknowledge the protection of the human rights generally (e.g. 2.6.1, 4.3.1). The EU-Africa declaration on migration and mobility recalls the 'respect of the fundamental rights of migrants, irrespective of their legal status' (3.5.2).

A number of themes can be found in the African and EU-led documents. This includes the protection of labour rights of migrants including social protection (e.g. 1.5.6) and very prominently combatting xenophobia and discrimination against migrants in host countries and facilitating their integration (e.g1.2.1). Addressing humanitarian obligations towards refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced people is also mentioned multiple times by all regions (e.g. 1.3.1). There is a strong emphasis in all the documents to protect especially vulnerable populations such as women, unaccompanied minors, asylum-seekers (e.g. 3.6.2) and especially victims of trafficking and smuggling (e.g. 2.3.6). The protecting of the rights of returnees is also mentioned by all regions, though in the EU-led ones it is found only in the Mobility Partnership documents (e.g. 4.1.1).

In terms of the migratory routes, the European Agenda on Migration states 'the immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need. The plight of thousands of migrants putting their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean has shocked us all' (1.1.2). All regions express similar concern at this 'humanitarian tragedy of significant proportion' (3.6.5) with the AU declaring the 3rd November 2013 as an Africa-wide day of mourning to remember the victims of the 'Lampedusa tragedy' (1.5.4). Several EU-led documents take this further, calling for the rescue of migrants at risk, one of the short-term objectives of the Partnership Framework being 'to save lives in the Mediterranean sea' (4.3.1). In sum therefore, in terms of human rights, the understanding of migration is consistent, where the rights especially of vulnerable populations need to be protected and concern is voiced at the number of deaths on migratory journeys.

To conclude so far, in terms of understanding migration no two distinct camps of migration-as-positive versus migration-as-a-challenge can be found. The rhetoric of the policy documents is fairly similar across the different regions, especially when it comes to human rights. But nuances do exist: with regards to mobility and development, African documents are slightly more pointed towards freedom of movement and the development potential of migration and the EU-led documents geared towards legal mobility and development in order to stop migration. In terms of securitization of migration policy, evidence for this can be found in all of the documents, showing the trend in a securitized understanding of migration. This is clearly the strongest for the EU-African documents, with surprisingly the EU documents keeping their securitization discourse minimal. The African documents are also on the whole more reserved in this security-migration rhetoric. The next section considers how migration is addressed.

Addressing Migration

Two general themes in terms of addressing migration can be found in the documents, namely regarding migration policies and migration actors. For the policy level, there is a tendency to call for the strengthening of migration institutions and national migration strategies (e.g. 2.7.1). This is part of a bigger

pattern that calls for the harmonization of policies, also known as the 'whole of governance approach' (e.g. 2.7.9). Though policies on the whole are still incoherent both between the different sectors (Prediger and Zanker, 2016) and between different EU Member states (ODI, 2016), there is a tendency to invoke the necessity of streamlining different policy sectors. This is especially when it comes to 'mainstreaming of migration in development thinking' (e.g. 1.1.1), but also includes calls to include strong asylum protection strategies in in national poverty reduction strategies (e.g. 3.1.2) or the coherence between security and migration policies (e.g. 2.7.3). Despite the fact most policy making continuous to be at a national level with regional and continental approaches 'recognised, but not yet encompassed' (3.4.), politically most contentious is to streamline migration regulation with foreign policies. Positive events are noted, like the democratic elections in the Gambia, which 'open[s] new possibilities for an enhanced bilateral relationship' (4.3.5), but other cases are ignored at best. A Sudanese representative for example notes as part of the Khartoum process, that 'Sudan is looking forward to a greater cooperation with the international community by lifting the unjust sanctions and economic embargo against Sudan' (2.4.2).

Partially as a result from this, on the EU-side the focus has recently turned to tailor-made approaches, incentives setting and also seeking out private investors in order to stop migration. In particular, the stakes between development and migration continue to be raised. Especially since the Valetta summit and the Partnership Framework, development cooperation has become explicitly tied to migration goals, increasingly with conditionalities attached. For example, the Communication on establishing a new partnership framework states that the 'positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals…' (4.3.1, see also 4.3.2). This means – at the most extreme - that only through agreeing to make efforts to regulate migration will development projects be viably entered into.

One policy area which everyone seems to agree on is the lack of reliable data and the need to build up better information and data on migration, including so-called migration observatories (e.g. 3.2.1). Therefore there is a consensus on the need for better data and policy harmonisation, but the devils is in the details. Here a strong direction can be found in the EU documents that area increasingly set on tailor-made incentive-based bilateral agreements on migration with their African partners.

As for the actors for addressing migration, the documents mention diaspora, civil society and more generally the 'gender dimension' or feminization of migration (e.g. 2.6.1). Both regions often refer civil society or to diaspora actors to be included in migration initiatives, as scholars have recognised for a while (2.1.1, 2.7.7, c.f. Newland and Patrick, 2004). Diaspora members are frequently linked to development, reiterating them as 'agents of development' (3.2.1) or noting their role in 'co-development' (e.g. 2.3.1). This also results in calls for the creation of 'socio-cultural structures for migrants…increasing their capacity

to undertake development actions' (2.1.3). In more general terms, the Rome Declaration and Programme (as part of the Rabat process) notes, 'the key role played by local actors, diasporas, civil society, the private sector and academia, in terms of management and in developing knowledge in the area of migration, as well as the need to increase cooperation between these actors and authorities at national and regional level' (2.1.5). All of the different regions agree that third actors need to be included in addressing migration, with the African and EU documents making more reference to diaspora actors, and the EU-African ones to the more general civil society, see Table 3 below.

The Valetta Action Plans, the highest-level summit between the EU and Africa on migration to date, lays out five aims for the future of EU-African relations on migration, which are: 1) addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, 2) enhancing the cooperation on legal migration and mobility; 3) reinforcing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; 4) preventing and fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings and 5) working more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration (see 3.6.2). These five areas of addressing migration will be considered in the rest of this analysis on the rhetoric of addressing migration.

Addressing root causes

The term root causes prominently appears in the documents, with a select few mentions of drivers (e.g. 4.3.1) or patterns of migration (2.7.4) and one mention of 'challenges that have an impact on migration' (3.6.1) (though these are not identical concepts, see Carling and Talleraas, 2016). The term 'root causes' is predominant in the EU-led documents, with much fewer mentions in the African documents, see Table 3 below.

Statements regarding root causes tend to be vague, like 'we need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration. Some of these are deep-seated but must be addressed' (1.1.2). They tend to err on listing the numerous causes, with less attention paid to how to actually address them. This leads one study to conclude that rather than really addressing root causes, the policies tend to address symptoms only (FES and CCPAU, 2016). Reitano also argues that for the Khartoum agreement, addressing root causes only appears at the end of the agreement, showing the priority this has. In addition, the focus is on the (lack of) 'sustainable development' as a root cause rather than acknowledging the cases of conflict and political persecution (Reitano, 2016).

In the documents analysed for this paper, there are three main interlinked clusters of root causes mentioned. Most popular is conflict and insecurity (e.g. 1.3.5), contrary to what Reitano found for the Khartoum agreement. This is followed closely by climate change/ environmental degradation/ natural

disasters (e.g. 2.6.2) and poverty/unemployment (1.2.1). If we use conflict, climate change and poverty as a proxy to look for this root causes, we see that the EU documents prioritize poverty, the EU-African ones climate change and the African ones conflict, see Table 3.

Table 3: The average frequency of certain terms in the policy documents when addressing migration

	African documents (65 documents)	EU-Africa documents (25 documents)	EU only documents (19 documents)
civil society OR NGO	0.8 (53)	6.7 (166)	0.3 (5)
diaspora	2.7 (173)	2.5 (63)	0.9 (17)
root causes	0.6 (42)	2 (49)	2.6 (49)
poverty	1.6 (103)	5.6 (115)	0.7 (7)
climate change	0.7 (48)	7.12 (178)	0.2 (4)
conflict	3.3 (213)	4.7 (117)	0.4 (8)
Legal	2.9 (186)	8.9 (222)	3.7 (70)
Return	2.1 (139)	4.8 (120)	9.4 (179)
voluntary AND return	0.6 (42)	4.1 (102)	1.7 (32)

A few documents note poor governance (e.g. 1.2.2) and the violation of human rights (1.3.3) as root causes for migration. Some nuances are added mainly by the African documents, who note the search for a better life or 'seeking greener pastures' (3.6.8) or point out displacement caused by large-scale development projects and private actors (1.3.1). Of note is also the mention of the 'uneven impact of globalisation' (3.1.2) and 'colonial ties' (2.3.1) as further causes. Two documents also mention that current mobility restrictions increase irregular migration (3.6.7, 2.7.8). In addition, some documents note the problems *caused by displacement* including conflict and environmental degradation (e.g. 1.3.20).

Only a few documents mention concrete measures to address these root causes, focusing in particular on different variations of conflict prevention, management and resolution or to 'silence the guns' (3.6.8). This is followed by sustainable growth and employment opportunities (e.g. 1.3.4). A few documents also mention the political situation in countries or origin, noting the need for 'good governance and the respect for the rule of law, elimination of corruption, promotion and protection of human rights' (3.1.2) and the need to 'fight environmental degradation' (2.7.1).

In sum, the term 'root causes' is predominately used in the EU-led documents with fewer mentions in the African documents. There is a tendency to focus on describing root causes, rather than on concrete solutions, which primarily argue for conflict resolution and alleviating poverty. More generally, the documents seem to favour discussing conflict and poverty in general terms, with occasional mentions of national political instability and the consequences of globalisation on poverty. Climate change and environmental degradation receives considerable attention but is not translated into concrete action. The different regions have varying focus of what they consider the most important root cause of migration: poverty (EU), climate change (EU-African documents) and conflict (African documents).

Legal migration

Legal migration was a priority for African states at the Valletta Summit (Witt and Both, 2016 see also 3.6.7). In terms of the document analysis however, the term legal is used most frequently for EU-African documents (8.9 per document on average), followed by the EU documents (3.7 times on average) and the least by African documents (2.9 times, see Table 3). A number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this. In terms of legal migration, it is much stronger in the EU-African rhetoric, and least prominent in the African documents, in contrast to what may be assumed from a common presumption regarding the importance of legal migration for African partners. A second surprising finding is that legal is not most prominently featured in the bilateral approaches, despite the fact this includes the mobility partnerships and the new partnership framework, see Table 4 below. For the African documents, it's not surprising that 61% of the usage appears in the regional approaches, after all a primary goal for the RECs is to open up freedom of movement. For the EU-African documents, it is perhaps also not surprising that the regional approach has the most frequent occurrence of the term legal (a primarily goal under the Rabat process), but that after that it is unexpected that it is used more frequently in the global approach rather than the bilateral approach, which includes the mobility partnerships. Moreover, for the EU-documents the term is more frequent in the global approach than in the bilateral ones, which includes the new partnership framework. The GAMM is in fact quite comprehensive and actually spends considerable time on the question of legal migration.

Rhetorically, legal migration is actually quite strong in the EU-led documents, and not just reserved for areas where it is most likely in practice, namely the bilateral agreements. Important to note however is the fact that legal migration does by no means only refer to possibilities of mobility between Africa and Europe. There is strong focus on mobility and labour rights within Africa, including from EU-led documents. The ECOWAS Common Approach to Migration states that 'free movement within the region has contributed to the reduction in the migratory pressures beyond ECOWAS borders' (2.6.1). In

consequence, numerous EU-led documents 'support intra African legal migration opportunities' (e.g. 2.1.3). More generally, when the documents are speaking of legal migration they are primarily talking about access to education – through scholarships, and making training and certificates more compatible (across Africa, e.g. 1.4.5). This is followed by labour migration (e.g. 3.6.1), including mentions of circular migration (e.g. 4.1.1) and moves to make visa procedures easier (e.g. 2.7.3). EU documents also highlight 'efficient asylum systems', 'humanitarian permits' (1.1.2) and 'resettlement' (4.3.1b) as a legal options.

Table 4: The spread of the word 'legal' across approaches

	Bilateral approach	Regional approach	Global approach	Total
African documents	/	**113 (61%)**	73 (39%)	186
EU-African documents	49 (22%)	**110 (50%)**	63 (28%)	222
EU documents	31 (44%)	/	**39 (56%)**	70

Many of the documents are quite vague when it comes to legal migration however, for example referring to it as the 'promotion of alternatives to irregular migration' (3.5.3). The EU-African documents also point out that more information should be made available to migrants regarding their legal options (e.g. 4.1.3). In sum therefore, there is a strong rhetoric for legal migration – especially in the EU-led documents, but it tends to be vague, refer frequently to education programmes or to legal migration *within* Africa. In addition, legal appears more in global EU documents rather than the bilateral ones (much like for the EU-African one), which are the documents that are supposed to enshrine the legal migration possibilities to Europe.

Protection of migrants and asylum seekers

As has been shown in Table 1, there is a very strong bias in addressing displaced people in African documents. The human rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – especially the most vulnerable – is generally admitted by all documents, as elucidated above. In particular, this is found with regards to the general protection of refugees and displaced persons under international law (e.g. 3.5.3). Humanitarian assistance is also noted on several occasions, despite the fact that this merely addresses the symptoms of displacement not the causes (1.3.2). In terms of longer-term solutions to addressing displaced people all regions consider voluntary repatriation or return of displaced people (e.g. 3.1.2) or resettlement of displaced people elsewhere (e.g. 2.2). The African documents accord strong rights to

displaced people, highlighting their suffering (e.g. 1.2.1), the need to tackle xenophobia in host communities (e.g. 2.7.1), insecurity in camps (e.g. 1.3.5) and avenues for reparations or compensation (e.g. 1.3.1.). In addition, the African documents also call for the local integration (e.g. 2.6.2) and self-sufficiency of displaced people to be improved, for example the Migration Policy Framework for Africa seeking to, 'enhance self-sufficiency of refugees and IDPs residing in camps, including, inter alia, granting rights to employment, access to land, freedom of movement and other social-economic rights when possible' (1.2.1). In other documents this also includes access to skills training and education (e.g. 1.3.11). Such self-sufficiency is also mentioned in the EU-led documents, but with the aim of finding out how 'EU external action can foster the resilience and self-reliance of forcibly displaced people *as close as possible* to refugees' country of origin' (emphasis added 4.3.1). Such an externalisation of protection mechanism is also highlighted through the focus in EU (and EU-African) documents on building up capacity for dealing with asylum cases (e.g. 4.1.3) and most notably to 'help develop safe and sustainable reception capacities and provide lasting prospects close to home for refugees and their families in third countries affected by migratory pressure' (4.3.1). Here the divergence between the EU and Africa is clear, with a statement by Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as Chairperson of the AU at the Valetta summit noting,

'The African Union is not in support of, and cannot endorse the establishment of the so-called processing centers in Africa. The Processing Centres, or whatever they may be called, are de facto detention centers that will constitute a serious violation of human rights and re-victimization of migrants' (3.6.8) see also (Pro Asyl, Medico International and Bread for the World, 2016).

To sum up, in terms of rhetoric therefore, the protection of refugees and displaced people is approached in different manners. The African region tends to focus on giving rights to displaced people including to enhance their local integration and self-sufficiency. At its most symbolic, this includes the right to intervention in order to create 'favourable conditions for finding durable solutions to the problem of internal displacement' (1.3.1). For the EU side, though protection of refugees is acknowledged, there is a clear tendency to favour the externalisation of refugee protection. This is likely to have increased since the period of observation under analysis for this paper.

Addressing irregular migration

Though only the fourth goal in the Valetta Action Plan, 'preventing and fighting irregular migration,' is in fact one of the major priorities from the European side. This has been highlighted by policy papers and position statements (FES and CCPAU, 2016, p. 4; Joint NGO statement, 2016) and can also be indicated

through the much higher frequency of the term irregular amongst the EU-led documents (see Table 1 above). In fact, it is a number of African documents which highlight the dangers that irregular migrants face, expressing concern over their safety (e.g. 1.5.1 but see also 3.5.1). In terms of addressing irregular migration, a number of solutions are proposed including improved border management, information campaigns and addressing human trafficking.

Whilst for the most part the policies seem to be addressing symptoms and facilitators of irregular migration (i.e. porous borders, weak domestic capacity), the EU-led documents also seek to address the root causes, 'bearing in mind the importance of finding alternatives to [irregular migration] … by providing employment opportunities for the youth at regional level' (3.5.2). This focus on job creation (especially for youth) and resilience in order to tackle irregular migration has a major priority under the post-Valetta EU Emergency Trust Fund (e.g. 4.3.1). Though this link is not explicit in the African documents, there is the concern, 'that the emphasis on addressing illegal or irregular migration has been only on security considerations rather than on broader development frameworks and on mainstreaming migration in development strategies' (1.2.2).

Beyond this, the solutions include domestic measures in host countries, such as improving legislation on migration management and its implementation, improving capacities of various institutions and better coordination and information flows between relevant authorities in different countries and regions. These domestic measures are mentioned in all the regions (e.g.1.2.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1). Though these domestic measures are at times formulated in a vague manner, i.e. 'particular attention should be paid to capacity-building to strengthen capacity in migration management' (4.3.1), it also includes concrete initiatives like a 'multi-purpose centre' in Agadez (Niger), which aims at ensuring provision of direct assistance and information to migrants, registration of migrants, as well as providing opportunities for safe and voluntary return and reintegration in cooperation with countries of origin' (3.6.2) and 'European Migration Liaison Officers to …help coordinate EU cooperation against migrant smuggling' (4.3.1). In addition, the EU-led documents in particular also call for data collection, evidence-based research and notably improved national civil registries (e.g. 4.3.1 see also 2.7.8).

Another major policy area that everyone can agree on is providing better information to (potential) migrants about the dangers of the journey (e.g. 2.7.5, 4.2.2). Most prominent to addressing irregular migration is border management and tackling human trafficking and smuggling, again focusing on symptoms of irregular migration, rather than root causes. Here all regions are consistent in their urgency to address these two matters. In terms of border management, 'elements of such a policy include

upgrading the capacities of border officials, physical infrastructure and enhancing communication and cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries' (1.2.1), joint patrols (e.g. 4.3.1) and improve intelligence-sharing between countries (e.g. 3.6.2). The First IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration Meeting in 2010 warns however for the need to 'ensure a delicate balance between effective security and management of borders to counter movement of terrorists whilst facilitating the smooth movement of genuine migrants, refugees and asylum seekers' (2.7.3).

Even more prominent than border control is the common enemy, human traffickers and smugglers (see also Table 2). The Declaration of the Fourth EU-Africa Summit from 2014 for example states that, 'we reiterate our unambiguous commitment to continue fighting trafficking in human beings, which is a new form of slavery' (3.5.1). Solutions which are offered to tackle trafficking include data collection (e.g. 2.3.6), cooperation, intelligence-sharing and capacity-building (e.g. 3.6.2), strengthening policy frameworks and implementation, prosecution of traffickers (3.5.3) and victim support (3.6.7). A few documents differentiate between trafficking and smuggling, including the Khartoum process, which states 'trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants are two distinct yet interrelated phenomena' (2.5.). More frequently however, 'the norm is that individuals who are being trafficked (victims) and those being smuggled (possible criminals) are equally prosecuted for illegal entry' (2.7.8). One of the ACP documents highlighted a victim-centred approach, arguing that 'it is also important to further promote the case of victims of smuggling of migrants as, despite the consent given, they are in a vulnerable situation' (2.3.6). Recently, the EU has turned to 'the creation of alternative income to replace the 'migration industry' (4.3.10) by providing economic opportunities especially involved in smuggling like in Niger (4.3.2). Illustrated in Table 5 however, shows a strong preponderance for African documents to address trafficking regionally, with the EU-African documents more focused in the global approaches and the EU documents keying in on the bilateral approach.

Table 5: The spread of the word 'trafficking or smuggling' across approaches

	Bilateral approach	Regional approach	Global approach	Total
African documents	/	**775 (84%)**	148 (16%)	923
EU-African documents	81 (21%)	115 (30%)	**187 (49%)**	383
EU documents	**105 (67%)**	/	51 (33%)	156

To sum up, addressing irregular migration is clearly a priority for the EU-led documents, though it appears across all regions. In terms of how to address this issue, the regions are fairly consistent in addressing the symptoms of irregular migration – focusing on border management, capacity-building and tackling

trafficking and smuggling. The EU-led documents directly link addressing irregular migration to job creation in Africa. A final major way to address irregular migration is through return, which brings me to the last point on the rhetoric.

Returning migrants

The fact that returning migrants is the final goal of the Valetta action plan should by no means undermine its importance in the EU documents. Indeed, the question of repatriation was discussed late into the night, especially regarding the degree of voluntariness, and left open for further discussion (Witt and Both, 2016). The term return is used on average 2.1 times in African documents, 4.8 times in the EU-African ones and a strong 9.4 times on average in each of the EU documents, see Table 3. In terms of their rhetorical commitment however, the EU is in favour of voluntary return, with the two appearing within one sentence on average 1.7 times compared only 0.6 times in the African documents (though both are overshadowed by the average 4.1 mentions of voluntary returns in the EU-African documents, see Table 3).

If we take a closer look at the documents we can see a number of further patterns. For a start, sometimes return is linked to students (e.g. 2.6.1), refugees (e.g. 1.3.3) or returning labour migrants (e.g. 2.1.5). For this analysis, the focus is however on the return of irregular migrants. The link between return as a way to achieve the goal of preventing and combatting irregular migration is made explicit in for example the EU-Ethiopia Common Agenda on Migration (4.2.2), an important tool in managing migration in the Dakar Strategy (2.1.4) and even as an important tool in breaking the business model of human traffickers (4.3.1). Some documents stress a 'preference' for voluntary return (e.g. 4.3.1). The ACP documents further discuss this, stating that 'the emphasis [is] placed on the forced return of illegal migrants as the last resort in a process which includes the promotion of voluntary return' (2.3.4) and that voluntary return is better for development (2.3.1). The Common African Perspective for Valetta Summit on Migration highlights that 'making voluntary return in dignity and safety [is] the cardinal principle … This is to further guarantee international protection of persons – both deserving and 'undeserving' of protection by way of asylum' (3.6.7). In any case, increasing returns is highlighted as a priority (e.g. 4.3.1) including within Africa (2.1.3).

One of the major ways this is to be carried out is through enhanced cooperation on returns, a recurrent theme on both continents (e.g. 2.5). The EU documents also make operational cooperation explicit, i.e. through border guards (e.g.4.3.2). The EU-led documents also mention cooperation on identification of irregular migrants and issuing their travel documents on several occasions (e.g. 4.3.5). Under the Partnership Framework, this extends to the goal of loosening up criteria for travel documents, seeking 'the acceptance by partner countries to use the EU laissez-passer for return operations' (4.3.1).

In order to regulate returns, the documents (and here they all concur) call for creating standards and procedures for 'effective, sustainable return' (i.e. 3.6.3) or a coherent policy (e.g. 4.3.1). In particular, this includes negotiations on return and readmission, which the Migration Policy Framework for Africa notes will ensure that 'returns are undertaken in a humane and orderly manner' (1.2.1). Negotiations on readmission agreements have been taken up again in particular since the Partnership Framework from 2016 (e.g. 4.3.2). The most recent trend in revisiting the negotiation of readmission agreements is to also include negative incentives if cooperation on returns is lacking (4.3.1). This principle is not new however, a link between readmission agreements to visa facilitations agreement already dating back to the GAMM (1.1.1) or talk of the 'creation of positive synergies between negotiations on visa facilitation and discussions in other areas such as readmission' in the Valetta Action Plan for 2015 (3.6.2). In the European Agenda on Migration from the same year the language is already more forceful, stating that one aim is to 'ensure a humane and dignified treatment of returnees and a *proportionate use of coercive measures*, in line with fundamental rights' (emphasis added, 1.1.2).

In terms of the situation in the countries of origin, the African documents also speak of creating 'conducive conditions' in order to return in safety (e.g. 1.3.12). Though they are referring to the return of refugees and displaced people, reintegration support more generally is widely reiterated in all of the documents (e.g. 2.7.1, 3.6.3, 4.3.7).

To sum up, though the EU clearly prioritises return more so than the other regions, in terms of the rhetoric they are clear to mention that returns are preferred to be voluntarily. The priority of return has become ever more important not least since the Partnership Framework and is matched with incentive setting through visa facilitation agreements or development projects. In terms of regulating returns, especially the EU-led documents propose that better cooperation is needed, standard and procedures especially readmission agreements and cooperation on identification and issuing travel documents. The strongest agreement between the countries is on the necessity of reintegration support once the returnees are back in their countries of origin.

In terms of addressing migration, the regions are more divided. They broadly agree on the need for better data and policy harmonisation, though the EU has a stronger approach on how to do this (through the Partnership Agreement). The regions also agree on the inclusion of civil society and diaspora actors in migration management. In addition, the regions also all agree that legal migration should exist, but often in rather vague terms and also focusing a lot on legal migration within Africa. The approach is more mixed when it comes to irregular migration. It is prioritised in the EU, but all the regions agree on broadly similar ways of addressing the symptoms of irregular migration by improving border management and tackling trafficking. Here, the documents appear to divert, with the EU-African documents seeking to address

trafficking primarily globally, the African documents regionally and the EU bilaterally. The regions also disagree on root causes, prioritised especially by the EU, with varying presumed primary root causes, ranging from poverty (EU), and climate change (EU-African) to conflict (African). For returns, even though there is consensus that it should be voluntarily -albeit with some differences in the nuances- there is much stronger emphasis on this in the EU documents, which also speak to incentivising returns. Moreover, the EU documents are detailed in their cooperation needs, especially regarding the identification and issuance of travel documents. There is consensus on needing to negotiate readmission agreements and to provide reintegration support for returnees. The regions also differ when it comes to the protection of refugees. The African region tends to focus on giving rights to displaced people including to enhance their local integration and self-sufficiency. For the EU side, though protection of refugees is acknowledged, there is a clear tendency to favour the externalisation of refugee protection. How is this rhetoric reflected in practice?

V.   The Practice of Migration

The practice of migration will be considered by looking at the implementation of the policy instruments introduced in the first section of the paper. As I will show in the following, implementation of the African and even the EU-African policies is largely limited, despite the strong rhetoric on this. For the EU, there is a more concrete policy implementation in recent years, primarily through the EUTF. In practice like in rhetoric the EU prioritises irregular migration, but unlike its rhetoric concrete action especially on legal migration is missing. These findings will be shown by first considering the implementation of the African instruments and the European ones more generally, before concentrating on the European Trust Fund projects in more detail.

With regards to the African instruments, when it comes to the protection of refugees and internally displaced people, the OAU and Kampala Conventions are pioneers in the field. This does not however always translate into practice. The OAU Convention lacks in implementation with State Parties not fulfilling their commitments and is badly in need of revision (Okello, 2014). A difficulty is of course the heavy burden on many African states hosting large refugee (and IDP) populations, though the Convention does emphasise burden sharing, stating, 'in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum' (Article II, Section 4 OAU Convention). Nonetheless, there is a trend for African states to close of their borders to refugees from neighbouring countries, and even those countries which are welcoming towards refugees do not always fulfil their obligations under the OAU Convention. Much of the rhetoric on refugee and IDP protection comes from the AU Executive Council which has less power than the Assembly (Welz, 2015). The Kampala Convention has been signed by 40 African countries, but only ratified by 25. In what ways it

may translate in practice – especially when the displacement is caused by the states themselves – is yet to be seen. Here again 'good intentions … [can be] … defeated by political imperatives' (Kamungi, 2010; see also Betts, 2016).

When it comes to migration governance more broadly, the lack of political will to implement policies has been repeatedly highlighted, making the policy frameworks, 'toothless bulldogs' (Horn of Africa Bulletin, 2016, p. 9). Despite the strong rhetoric focus on mobility for example, implementation continues to falter. This is not least due to weak framework and lack of technical capacity. The AU Migration Policy Framework is not legally binding and is therefore a rather weak instrument. Moreover, by 2016, three people were working on migration in the Department of Social Affairs, compared to an estimate amounting to over 400 in the EU (Witt and Both, 2016; see also Welz, 2015). Another issue is that the AU Commission depends on the RECs to enforce their decisions on migration. These in turn are not the implementing agents either, rather they are dependent on their Member States to implement policy (Welz, 2015). This means it is up to the individual countries to translate these policies into national laws, which due to a lack of political will means that 'effective governance of migration issues has continued to be undermined' (Horn of Africa Bulletin, 2016, p. 7).

Even ECOWAS, prized as the role model for African mobility, also faces implementation problems. Mobility and freedom of movement tends to be more theoretical than de jure practice (Parkes, 2017). Movement is often hindered by corruption at the borders.[9] This in turn replaces visa costs with the (informal) fees paid directly to the border controllers (Brachet, 2010). Increasingly, the ECOWAS mobility is also threatened by the emphasis of dealing with 'irregular migration' from Europe which diverts attention from regional migration (Haas, 2008). This is particularly the case when it comes to northern Niger, where a common external ECOWAS border policy (to Libya) has not yet been developed (Parkes, 2017). To sum up, in practice for the African instruments, the emphasis of migration is on mobility, followed by refugee and IDP protection. This follows the rhetoric, see above, though both are hindered by implementation shortfalls.

The European-African instruments also vary in their implementation. The ACP Observatory on Migration for example was not only launched but even wrapped up a four year study on South-South migration in 2014 (IOM Press Release, 2014). Beyond this, despite the numerous summits and meetings, achievements are few and far between, depending on political commitments of individual states (Welz, 2015). The Rabat process has had limited tangible results despite having been running for more than a decade (Reitano, 2016) and was described as 'sleepy' by the French Press during the Paris Summit in 2015.

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[9] Though as Haas argues, 'if Europeans are unable to seal off their borders, African states can hardly be expected to do so either' (2008).

The Khartoum process is even more difficult to implement considering the lack of mobility available there, worsened by the fact that Sudanese and Eritreans citizens are not even allowed to legally leave their countries without permission and the lack of trust between the countries participating (Reitano, 2016). It has been criticised for co-opting the longer-running AU Horn of Africa Initiative, which had been formalised just five months beforehand. Cooperation under the Khartoum process has also been condemned for failing to address root causes of forced displacement, re-orientating EU migration policies towards security to the detriment of development and a failure to commit to working on legal migration alternatives (Stern, 2015; Reitano, 2016; Koch, 2017). Moreover, the process has been morally undermined due to the cooperation with questionable regimes, including the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court (Dahlkamo and Popp, 2016; Fraser, 2016).

The lack of implementation for both the EU and the EU-African instruments and policies highlights the fact that perhaps migration is after all not a strong priority, despite the rhetorical commitment to addressing the issue.

Hackenesch and Keijzer argue that in contrast to any political discourse, the EU and Africa are far from a common approach on migration (2016, p. 21; see also Welz, 2015, p. 106). The EU also diverts from their rhetoric. Despite the strong rhetoric on legal migration, the Blue card system is thus far rarely used and Valetta only introduced vague measures such as the promise to double the number of Erasmus + students. In terms of implementation, things have changed since the Valetta Summit of 2015 and the Partnership Framework of 2016. The sense of urgency is clear. Returns occur at a notoriously slow pace despite the clear aim in the rhetoric of the EU documents. Shortly after the Partnership Agreement came out however, the legal framework of FRONTEX changed, with them now being able to assist member states in returning failed asylum seekers, through coordination and organising 'return operation' and pooling 'forced-return monitors, forced-return escorts and return specialists' (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). By June 2017, twelve European Migration Liaison Officers have been send to priority third countries of origin and transit and numerous identification missions have been carried out (European Commission, 2017b). The best way to see the EU priorities in practice is through the Emergency Trust Fund, which is discussed in more detail next.

The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

Launched during the Valetta Summit in November 2015, the aim was to 'show once more the EU's commitment to swiftly reply to the large challenges we are facing in the region', and thus the Trust seeks

to consider 'stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa' (European Commission, 2015). A total of 2.6 billion € have been pledged from the European Development Fund and the EU budget, with member states asked to match this. Thus far around 202.4 million € have been pledged by member states, many of whom are struggling to finance the influx of refugees in migrants in their home countries (Castillejo, 2016; European Commission, 2017a, 2017c).

The EUTF seeks to swiftly set up projects addressing four main goals: 1) greater economic and employment opportunities; 2) strengthening the resilience of (vulnerable) communities; 3) improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination and 4) improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration. Goals 1 and 2 emphasise addressing the root causes of irregular migration (jobs and resilience) with only Goal 4 clearly addressing causes of displacement (through governance and conflict prevention). The third goal focuses on managing migration. None of these goals presume a positive migration-for-development nexus nor do they focus on legal forms of migration to Europe, despite the rhetoric as outlined above. In total there are 108 projects currently approved by the EUTF Operative Committee (see Appendix B).[10]

If we sort the projects into goals and regions a number of issues can be highlighted, see Table 6 below.[11] Firstly, there is a strong regional emphasis on the Sahel and Lake Chad, with nearly six times the amount of funding compared to North Africa. This is likely due to the much stronger pre-existing relationships with North Africa, notably through the Mobility Partnership Agreements (Prediger and Zanker, 2016). Similarly, there are 61 projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad region[12], 39 in the Horn of Africa and 7 in North Africa. Secondly, the goals show clear preferences of EU migration policy in practice. The most funding is clearly assigned to addressing jobs (522.33 million €) and resilience (514.78 million €), with a predominant focus on jobs in the Sahel (28 projects) and on resilience (29 projects) in the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Though part of the reason this occurs is because employment and nutrition programmes are easier to fund (Castillejo, 2016), this also highlights the preference for dealing with the causes of *irregular migration* instead of forced displacement*. These preferences are further nuanced when considering the projects

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[10] The figures below are only those which have been committed, approx. 1.7 billion €, which is higher than what has been contracted, approx. 729.7 million € and actually disbursed, approx. 266.7 million € (European Commission, 2017c).

[11] In the table below the projects were listed under each of the goals they aim to fulfil to illustrate the number of projects for each goal. Because many of the projects have multiple goals they appear two or three or even four times. The funding was however split accordingly, though of course this is only a crude approximation. E.g. Project N°58 (Programme to strengthen resilience and peaceful coexistence in Chad) is funded with 18mMillion € and aims to address Goals 1, 2 and 4 and therefore 6 million € was assigned to each category.

[12] According to the latest EUTF Factsheet there are a total of 112 projects, including 65 for the Sahel and Lake Chad Window, but only 61 are listed on the EUTF Website. The 4 missing projects explain the difference between the official EU figures of 918.5 million € in funding for the Sahel Zone and the total of 901.3 million € by my own calculations.

and funding proportionally. Here we can see that the average project for jobs and resilience is around 9.7 million €. Those seeking to address governance and conflict prevention – arguably the most complicated and enduring challenge of the four goals average around 9 million € per project. In contrast stand migration management, which though there are the least projects with this specific goal, have an average 10.4 million € funding per project.

Table 6: An Overview of the EUTF according to region and goals

| | | NUMBER OF PROJECTS AND FUNDING | | |
		Sahel and Lake Chad	Horn of Africa	North of Africa	Total funding and projects per goal
EUTF Goals	**Goal 1: Jobs**	28 (290. 45 million)	22 (170.38 million)	4 (61.5 million)	54 (30%) (522.33 million)
	Goal 2: 'Resilience'	19 (194.85 million)	29 (244.18 million)	5 (75.75 million)	53 (30%) (514.78 million)
	Goal 3: Migration Management	19 (225.1 million)	9 (83.83 million)	3 (14.5 million)	31 (17%) (323.43 million)
	Goal 4: governance and conflict prevention	18 (190.9 million)	21 (166.63 million)	1 (2.75 million)	40 (22%) (360.28 million)
Total funding per Region		**901.3 million €**	**665.02 million €**	**154.5 million €**	

Source: *Own compilation from the EUTF website (see Appendix B)*

Thirdly therefore, the goal of migration management is given the proportionally largest projects.[13] What does migration management entail? Analysing the 31 projects that aim to address the third goal of the EUTF in more detail, at least five mention a rather general variation on 'promoting strengthened migration management' at both national and local levels (Project n° 6, 15, 16, 42 and 50). More specific targets include encouraging diaspora investment (two projects both in West Africa), capacity building for managing migrant influxes (two projects) and the development, harmonisation and implementation of

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[13] Similarly, FRONTEX has seen its budget grow swiftly since its founding in 2004 and the EU gives significantly more funding to the external borders fund than refugee funds (Andersson, 2016).

migration policies ranging from human trafficking to labour laws (3 projects). A total of four projects aim to fight organised crime and human trafficking. Very popular is awareness and sensitisation campaigns to deter people from leaving in the first places (7 projects) as well as projects aimed at setting up research observatories, monitoring and evaluating projects and enhancing data collection (13 projects). Eight projects concentrate on rule of law, border control and enhancing security and an overwhelming 11 projects focus on improving conditions for voluntary return and reintegration. Though a few of the sensitisation campaigns make reference to legal migration – the focus of one project even being on freedom of mobility, albeit in the IGAD region (Project n°102) – the overall emphasis is on (voluntary) returning migrants and securing borders. The repatriation projects includes internally displaced in South Sudan and repatriated refugees to Somalia (Project n°81, 94 respectively). Given the political situation in these countries questions the very feasibility and appropriateness of such projects. The South Sudan repatriation of IDP project is – perhaps unsurprisingly – currently on hold (see footnote 13 below). The border control projects have also received much critique (e.g. Hirt, 2017). At best, such projects give mixed signals to contentious regimes like the ICC-indicted Omar al-Bashir, at worst they strengthen their security forces and worsen conditions for refugees on the move. Consequently, such projects may be in contradiction to European foreign policy and diplomatic actions and risk contradicting basic European human rights standards (Castillejo, 2016; Prediger and Zanker, 2016).

Despite all the talk of root causes, there is a clear preference for addressing poverty-related causes of migration rather than conflict ones. In terms of the vague 'migration management,' though rule of law and border control are prominent they are outshined by projects focusing on returns and data collection. This is in line with the EU rhetoric as shown above. So does the EU put their money where their mouth is? To a degree yes. They focus on poverty-related causes of migration, highlight irregular migration over displaced persons and prioritise returns. Everyone agrees that more and better data is needed on migration. But EU policies are also more securitized in practice than their much more reserved rhetoric. Looking at the EUTF projects also shows that there is no clear indication of better policy harmonization. Worse, their practice on legal migration and protecting the human rights of migrants stands in contrast to their strong rhetorical stances on these matters. Thus, in practice like in rhetoric the EU priorities irregular migration, but unlike its rhetoric concrete action especially on legal migration is missing.

VI.   Conclusion

This paper wanted to examine a common critique that European interests when it comes to migration are vastly different from their African counterparts. This question is politically highly critical because only with a common agenda is any action on the matter likely to work.

Interpreting the rhetoric shows that much more attention is paid to treating symptoms rather than causes, even in the discussion on root causes. This is in line with the critique that migration policies tend to be reactive (Walters, 2010; Koch, Knoll and Mawowa, 2015; Welz, 2015; Witt and Both, 2016). Moreover, the similarity in rhetoric where it does exist – especially in terms of securitization and irregular migration - could also be related to the impact of EU discourses on African ones. This can have detrimental effects, with for instance a reversal of mobility in the ECOWAS region because of the focus on securing borders as a reflection of EU interests (Fresia, 2014; see also Brachet, 2010; Haas, 2008). Though there are clear similarities on a rhetorical level, there are also differences especially when it comes to how to address migration. In practice, both the African and EU-African policy initiatives falter in their implementation, but when it comes to the EU-practice a clear prioritisation can be seen, which in parts contradicts their rhetoric. Taken together, the interests are diverging – and perhaps increasingly so – and the rhetoric does not match up with the practice. At worst, this risks further fragmenting a coherent approach on migration.

In terms of rhetoric on migration, the definition is broadly similar between the different regions, albeit with more attention paid towards displaced people and irregular migrants in Africa and the EU respectively. When it comes to the understanding of migration, this is also surprisingly similar. The documents strongly agree on protecting human rights for example. Nonetheless, clear if somewhat nuanced differences can be found. Rhetorically, the African documents tend to point more towards the freedom of movement and the development potential of migration with the EU-led documents geared towards legal mobility and development in order to stop migration. When it comes to addressing migration, there is no universal approach for identifying the root causes of migration, returns and protecting refugees and displaced people. Yet, the lack of implementation for both the African and the EU-African instruments and policies also points to the fact that perhaps migration is not so important after all.

For the EU, implementation is much stronger. It is not entirely true that the EUTF projects overtly favour strengthening borders to the detriment of development and addressing long-term root causes of migration (e.g. Reitano, 2016, p. 11; Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017, p. 12). There is a strong focus on creating jobs and improving resilience. Yet, the EUTF itself does little to dispel accusation of African exclusion. The majority if not all implementing agents of the EUTF-funded projects are European or international aid agencies and organisations (FES and CCPAU, 2016). Moreover, the whole operational nature of the EUTF discourages local ownership by African partners (in contrast to mechanisms under the Cotonou Agreement, though there is some evidence that they play a role in choosing the projects, just not when it comes to the implementation (Castillejo, 2016; Hackenesch and Keijzer, 2016, p. 21). A major shortcoming of the EUTF is the lack in transparency. Though a section of the EC Website is dedicated to

the Trust Fund, gaining an oversight into the number of projects and the goals they seek to achieve is a task that needs time and dedication.[14] The descriptions of the projects (when you can find them) are not uniform and not all of them have a clear indication of what they seek to achieve.[15]A number of projects are very vague in their description or even in contradiction to their stated goals. For example a project on 'supporting the resilience of displaced people in North-Mali and support for peaceful coexistence between local communities'[16] is stated to be targeting Goal 3 – managing migration – despite the obvious relevance for Goal 4 of conflict prevention. Another project in Burkina Faso seeks to 'contribute to regional stability' and 'better migration management', in addition to 'improving resilience' and 'increase the income of young people' , yet states to be targeting Goals 1 and 2 only (Project n°36). Finally, the funding for the EUTF on the whole is tiny if we consider the task at hand, and especially in comparison to the funding given to Turkey – 2.6 billion € for 23 countries compared to 3 billion € just for Turkey (see also Koch, Knoll and Mawowa, 2015; Castillejo, 2016, p. 9). In October 2017, Jean-Claude Juncker warned of a 225 million € pay-gap for the EUTF, urging member states to pay up their dues (Rankin, 2017).

Rhetorically, the EU is overall quite positive in their rhetoric on migration, limiting their securitized discourse, championing legal migration. But the emphasis in practice on the securitization of migration management and treating migration as primarily poverty-incited increasingly diverts the EU approach from African frameworks geared towards mobility and legal migration. The risk is that if the EU focuses so much on empty rhetoric that their policies only add to further incoherence of their migration strategy.

Of course one reason for the policy incoherence could also be the incompatibility of the fundamental goals of different policy areas, say restricting movement and foreign policy or development goals (Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Another problem is that little can be done at the institutional level of organisations like the EU and AU and it comes down to individual member states. EU institutions have shown strong instruments for addressing migration, not least since the Partnership Framework. But the problem remains with the individual member states and the lack of a common framework for asylum and labour migration (Andersson, 2016; Gaibazzi, Bellagamba and Dünnwald, 2017; ODI, 2016). African states and institutions have difficulty responding to this, with a study conducted by the FES concluding that 'EU oscillates between bilateral and multilateral, lacks consistency and gives AU member states 'too many masters''(FES and CCPAU, 2016). Similarly, the AU tends to be influenced by member states that have a

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[14] Here I would like to thank Verena Staiger and Julia Schuster for their research assistance.

[15] I self-assigned goals to 13 of the projects (Project n° 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 22, 23, 53, 81, 82, 92, 95, 97, 105) including three which did not have further information in an action document. These were in Somalia (Project n° 92) and in South Sudan where the website states reviews are ongoing on the project due to the current situation in the country (Project n° 81, 82).

[16] Own translation, "Renforcement de la résilience des populations déplacées par l'instabilité au Nord-Mali et soutien à la coexistence pacifique entre communautés", Project n°31.

strong coherent position on an issue like migration, and given the lack of debate in the body overall, questions whether any African government in fact has a consistent stance at all. In fact, hidden interests are likely to play a role. Hein de Haas makes a case that neither African nor European states have interests in stopping irregular migration, since both sending and receiving states are dependent on remittances and migrant labour (Haas, 2008; Rich, 2010). In fact, Haas argues that 'in order to understand this gap between rhetoric and practice, it is important to realise that states are no monolithic entities but harbour diverse, often conflicting political and economic interests' (2008, p. 1318). Future research must necessarily not just consider these political interests of migration politics for European countries, but also for their African counterparts.

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Appendix A: List of Documents for Content Analysis

Region	Name	Code	Approach
EU Documents	Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions, The Global Approach To Migration And Mobility (2011)	1.1.1	Global
	Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions, A European Agenda On Migration (2015)	1.1.2	
	A European Union Emergency Trust Fund For Africa (2015)	3.6.3	
	President Juncker launches the EU Emergency Trust Fund to tackle root causes of irregular migration in Africa (2015)	3.6.4	
	Communication On Establishing A New Partnership Framework With Third Countries Under The European Agenda On Migration (2016)	4.3.1	Bilateral
	Niger Action And Progress Under The Migration Partnership Framework (2016)	4.3.10	
	Ethiopia Action And Progress Under The Migration Partnership Framework (2016)	4.3.11	
	Fact Sheet Migration Partnership Framework A New Approach To Better Manage Migration (2016)	4.3.1b	
	1st Progress Report, On The Partnership Framework With Third Countries Under The European Agenda On Migration (2016)	4.3.2	
	2nd Progress Report, 1st Deliverables On The Partnership Framework With Third Countries Under The European Agenda On Migration (2016)	4.3.5	

	Senegal Action And Progress Under The Migration Partnership Framework (2016)	4.3.7	
	Mali Action And Progress Under The Migration Partnership Framework (2016)	4.3.8	
	Nigeria Action And Progress Under The Migration Partnership Framework (2016)	4.3.9	
	Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde (2008)	4.1.1	
	Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States (2013)	4.1.2	
	Press Release, EU and Tunisia establish their Mobility Partnership (2014)	4.1.3	
	EU-Nigeria Common Agenda on Migration (2015)	4.2.1	
	EU-Ethiopia Common Agenda on Migration (2015)	4.2.2	
	Press Release, European Union and Ethiopia sign Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (2015)	4.2.3	
African Documents	The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2016)	1.2.1	**Global**
	African Common Position on Migration and Development (2006)	1.2.2	
	Decision on Draft Framework for a Migration Policy for Africa (2006)	1.2.3	
	Decision on African Common Position on Migration and development (2006)	1.2.4	
	African Union Convention For The Protection And Assistance Of Internally Displaced Persons In Africa, Kampala Convention (2009)	1.3.1	
	Decision on the Rules of Procedure of the Revitalized African Union Coordinating Committee on Assistance and Protection to Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (CCAR) (2008)	1.3.10	
	Decision on the Policy on Access to Post-Primary Education for Victims of Forced Displacement in Africa (2008)	1.3.11	
	Decision on the Situation of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2008)	1.3.12	
	Decision on the Report of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2009)	1.3.13	
	Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Initially Displaced Persons in Africa (2009)	1.3.14	
	Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Person in Africa (2010)	1.3.15	
	Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2010)	1.3.16	
	Decision on the Implementation of the Plan of Action for the Outcomes of the Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa - (2010)	1.3.17	
	Decision On The Humanitarian Situation In Africa (2011)	1.3.18	
	Decision On The Humanitarian Situation In Africa (2011)	1.3.19	
	Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons (2005)	1.3.2	
	Decision on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa (2012)	1.3.20	
	Decision on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa (2012)	1.3.21	
	Decision on the report of the Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2014)	1.3.22	
	Decision On The Humanitarian Situation In Africa (2014)	1.3.23	
	Press Release, The first Session of the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Migration, Refugees and internally Displaced Persons (2015)	1.3.24	
	Decision On The Reports Of The PRC Sub-Committee, On The Situation Of Refugees, Returnees And Internally Displaced Persons In Africa (2015)	1.3.25	

Decision On The Reports Of The PRC Sub-Committees, On Humanitarian Situation In Africa (2015)	1.3.26	
Decision On The Activities Of The Permanent Representatives' Committee, On Refugees, Returnees And Internally Displaced Persons In Africa (2016)	1.3.27	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons (2005)	1.3.3	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons (2006)	1.3.4	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons (2006)	1.3.5	
Decision on the Ministerial Conference on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2006)	1.3.6	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa (2007)	1.3.7	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa (2007)	1.3.8	
Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2008)	1.3.9	
Decision On The Ministerial Meeting On Free Movement In Africa (2005)	1.4.1	
Decision on Free Movement of Persons in Africa (2007)	1.4.2	
Decision on the Implementation of the Agenda of the African Union on Free Movement in Africa (2007)	1.4.3	
Decision Of The Sandton Ministerial Retreat Of The Executive Council On The First 10-Year Implementation Plan Of Agenda 2063 (2015)	1.4.4	
Declaration On Migration, AU Free Movement of Persons (2015)	1.4.5	
Decision on the Free Movement of Persons and the African Passports (2016)	1.4.6	
Decision on Migration and Development (2006)	1.5.1	
Decision on the Establishment of the African Centre for Study and Research on Migration (2006)	1.5.2	
Decision on Africa-EU Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development (2007)	1.5.3	
Declaration on the Lampedusa (Italy) Tragic Boat Incident (2013)	1.5.4	
The AU Commission Strategic Plan 2014-17 (2013)	1.5.5	
Declaration On Employment, Poverty Eradication, Inclusive Development In Africa (2015)	1.5.6	
Press Release, AUC Chairperson expresses deep regret over the disappearance of 300 migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea (2015)	1.5.7	
Press Release, African Union holds Memorial Service for Migrant Victims (2015)	1.5.8	
AU Concept Note Factoring In Outcomes Of The Valletta Summit 2015)	3.6.5	
Press Release, Factoring in Outcomes of the Valletta Summit (2015)	3.6.6	
The Common African Perspective For Valletta Summit On Migration (2005)	3.6.7	
Statement by H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Occasion of the Valletta Summit on Migration (2015)	3.6.8	
Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons (signed 2005 yet to come into force) (2005)	2.1.a	Regional
The Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (2006)	2.2	
Press Release, AU Convene A Regional Conference To Address Human Trafficking And Smuggling In The Horn Of Africa (2014)	2.4.1	

	Press Release, AU Regional Ministerial Conference Calls for Stronger Collaborative Approach to Tackle Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa (2014)	2.4.2	
	Press Release, Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants within and from the Horn of Africa (2016)	2.4.3	
	ECOWAS Common Approach On Migration (2008)	2.6.1	
	ECOWAS – Memorandum on Equality of Treatment for Refugees with other Citizens of Member States of ECOWAS in the exercise of Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment (2007)	2.6.2	
	IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework, Adopted by the 45th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers (2012)	2.7.1	
	IGAD-Migration Action Plan (MAP) to operationalize The IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF) 2015-2020 (2014)	2.7.2	
	1st IGAD-RCP Meeting on Migration Management in the IGAD Region (2010)	2.7.3	
	2nd IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration (RCP), Migration & Development at the ECA (UNCC) (2012)	2.7.4	
	3rd meeting of the IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Regional Integration (2013)	2.7.5	
	4th IGAD Regional consultative Process on Migration Report (2014)	2.7.6	
	5th IGAD Report, Theme: Labour Migration (2015)	2.7.7	
	6th IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration, Theme: Trafficking in Persons (TIPS) and Migrant Smuggling (2015)	2.7.8	
	7th IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration, Migration Governance in the IGAD Region, Summary Report (2016)	2.7.9	
EU –African Documents	Rabat Action Plan (2006)	2.1.1	Regional
	Rabat Declaration (2006)	2.1.2	
	Three-Year Cooperation Programme, Paris 2009- 2011 (2008)	2.1.3	
	The Dakar Strategy 2012- 2014 (2011)	2.1.4	
	The Rome Declaration and Programme 2015-17 (2014)	2.1.5	
	ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on migration of skilled workers and its effect on national development (2007)	2.3.1	
	Revised Cotonou Agreement and Declaration II: Joint Declaration on Migration and Development (2010)	2.3.2	
	Joint Declaration of the European Union and its Member States and the ACP countries on the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2010)	2.3.3	
	Report to the ACP-EU Joint Council on the 2011-2012 dialogue on migration and development (2013)	2.3.4	
	Report from the ACP-EU Council of Ministers to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the implementation of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement in 2012 (2015)	2.3.5	
	ACP-EU Dialogue on migration and development - Recommendations from the ACP-EU experts' meeting on trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants (2015)	2.3.6	
	Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (2016)	2.3.7	
	Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) (2014)	2.5	
	Press Release, Euro-African Conference in Paris on migration and development: the Commission asks its partners to deliver on their commitments (2008)	3.3	

Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (2006)	3.1.1	
Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development (2006)	3.1.2	
The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007)	3.2.1	
1st Action Plan (2008-2010) For The Implementation Of The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007)	3.2.2	
Joint Africa-EU Strategy Second Action Plan 2011-2013 (2010)	3.4	Bilateral
Declaration, 4th EU-Africa Summit (2014)	3.5.1	
EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, 4th EU-Africa Summit (2014)	3.5.2	
Roadmap 2014-2017, 4th EU-Africa Summit (2014)	3.5.3	
Action Plan 2014-2017: Priorities for future cooperation in the area of Migration and Mobility in the framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2014)	3.5.4	
Political Declaration, Valetta Summit on Migration (2015)	3.6.1	
Action Plan, Valetta Summit on Migration (2015)	3.6.2	

Appendix B: Overview of EUTF Projects (May 2017)

Region	PROJECT NUMBER	LOCATION AND LINK	TITLE OF PROJECT	EMERGENCY TRUST FUND GOAL	FUNDING (€)
North of Africa	1	Tunisia Link	Favoriser la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale migratoire de la Tunisie (T05-EUTF-NOA-TN-01)	1, 3*	11.5 million
	2	Morocco Link	Vivre ensemble sans discrimination : une approche basée sur les Droits de l'Homme et la dimension de genre (T05-EUTF-NOA-MA-01)	2, 4	5.5 million
	3	Algeria. Egypt. Libya. Morocco. Tunisia Link	DEV-pillar of the Regional Development and Protection Programme in the North of Africa	1, 2*	10 million
	4	Libya Link	Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations in Libya	2, 3*	6 million
	5	Libya Link	Supporting protection and humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya (T05-EUTF-NOA-LY-02)	2*	20 million

	6	Egypt Link	Enhancing the response to migration challenges in Egypt	1, 3*	11.5 million
	7	Libya 12/04/2017 Link	Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection space and supporting local socio-economic developmen	1, 2*	90 million
Sahel and Lake Chad	8	Mauritania 04/2016 Link	Programme to integrate disadvantaged young people into the building sector (PECOBAT)	1	3.2 million
	9	Mauritania 04/2016 Link	Programme to protect migrant children against exploitation and trafficking	4	3 million
	10	Mautitania 12/2016 Link	Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale	1	14 million
	11	Mauritania 12/2016 Link	Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie	3	8 million
	12	Mauritania 12/2016 Link	Programme de promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie	1, 2	10 million
	13	Burkina Faso. Mali. Mauritania. Niger and Chad 06/2016 Link	Support for regional cooperation in G5 countries and the Sahel Security College	3	7 million
	14	Gambia 06/2016 Link	The Gambia youth empowerment scheme	1	11 million
	15	Gambia 12/2019 Link	Programme to strengthen the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in The Gambia	3	3.9 million
	16	Senegal 12/2016 Link	Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations, retour et réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise	3	27.9 million
	17	Senegal 12/2016 Link	Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique	4	28 million
	18	Senegal 12/2016 Link	Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués	1	18 million

	19	Senegal 12/2016 Link	Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal	1	14.3 million
	20	Senegal 04/2016 Link	Programme to support reducing migration through the creation of rural jobs in Senegal by setting up village and small family farms ('Naatangué' farms) in regions with a high migration potential	1	20 million
	21	Senegal 04/2016 Link	Developing employment in Senegal: strengthening businesses competitiveness and employability in departure areas	1	40 million
	22	Senegal 01/2016 Link	Programme to enhance food and nutrition security in the Matam region, which is a migrant departure area	2*	1.1 million
	23	Senegal 01/2016 Link	Resilience of people most vulnerable to food and nutrition crises in departure areas	2*	8 million
	24	Senegal 01/2016 Link	Normalisation of the living conditions of people directly affected by the conflict in Casamance	2	4.5 million
	25	Mali 04/2016 Link	Programme to support the Malian diaspora's investments in regions of origin	1, 3	6 million
	26	Mali 01/2016 Link	Security and Development in northern Mali	2	13 million
	27	Mali 01/2016 Link	Programme to support peace agreements through economic regeneration and assistance for local authorities in northern Mali	1	10 million
	28	Mali 01/2016 Link	Job creation by improving the cashew nut sector to alleviate the causes of emigration	1	13.5 million
	29	Mali 01/2016 Link	Programme to support peace agreements through resilience and access to basic services in the northern regions	2	20 million
	30	Mali. Burkina Faso 12/2016 Link	Création d'emplois équitables et développement durable de micro-entreprises à travers la gestion responsable et éthique de chaines de valeur spécifiques liées aux secteurs de la Mode, du 'lifestyle' et de l'aménagement d'intérieur	1	10 million
	31	Mali. Burkina Faso. Mauritanie. Niger 12/2016 Link	Renforcement de la résilience des populations déplacées par l'instabilité au Nord-Mali et soutien à la coexistence pacifique entre communautés	2, 3	20 million
	32	Mali 12/2016 Link	Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali	3	15 million
	33	Mali 12/2016 Link	Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé	4	25 million

	34	Mali 12/2016 Link	Programme l'emploi des jeunes crée des opportunités au Mali	1	20 million
	35	Mali 06/2016 Link	Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)	3, 4	29 million
	36	Burkina Faso 04/2016 Link	Socio-economic integration project for women in the Sahel	1, 2	5.2 million
	37	Burkina Faso 06/2016 Link	Support programme for integrated border management in Burkina Faso (PAGIF-BF)	3, 4	25 million
	38	Burkina Faso 12/2016 Link	Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso	3	8.3 million
	39	Burkina Faso 12/2019 Link	Programme d'appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entreprenariat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso	1	10 million
	40	Burkina Faso 12/2016 Link	Programme d'Appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques	1	7 million
	41	Burkina Faso 04/2016 Link	Resilience of the most vulnerable people in Northern Burkina Faso	2	25 million
	42	Niger 12/2016 Link	Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger (Sustainable Return from Niger – SURENI)	3	15 million
	43	Niger 12/2016 Link	Plan d'Actions à Impact Economique Rapide à Agadez (PAIERA)	1, 4	8 million
	44	Niger 12/2016 Link	Soutien à la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région de Diffa	4	12 million
	45	Niger 06/2016 Link	Support for justice and security in Niger to fight organised crime, smuggling and human trafficking (AJUSEN)	3, 4	30 million
	46	Niger 04/2016 Link	Setting up a joint investigation team to combat irregular immigration, human trafficking and people smuggling	3, 4	6 million
	47	Niger 04/2016 Link	Integrating young people into employment in the transit areas of Zinder and Agadez in Niger	1	6.9 million
	48	Niger 04/2016 Link	Creating jobs in the transit areas of Tahoua and Agadez in Niger	2	30 million
	49	Niger 01/2016 Link	Programme to support local development and governance for better management of migratory flows	3	25 million
	50	Niger 01/2016 Link	Response mechanism and resources for migrants	3, 4	7 million

	51	Nigeria 04/2016 Link	Investing in the safety and integrity of Nigerian girls (I-SING)	1, 2	3.5 million
	52	Nigeria 04/2016 Link	Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North East Nigeria	4	21 million
	53	Nigeria 12/2016 Link	Programme "The Right to Write" in Nigeria	1, 2, 4	2.4 million
	54	Nigeria 12/2016 Link	Programme to strengthen Psychosocial Support, Mental Health, Reintegration and Protection Services for children in Borno, including children associated with Boko Haram	2	4.5 million
	55	Nigeria 12/2016 Link	Strengthening Migration Governance in Nigeria and Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants	3	15.5 million
	56	Nigeria 04/2016 Link	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting stability and safety of communities in displacement in North East Nigeria	1, 2	11.6 million
	57	Chad 04/2016 Link	Resilience in Lake Chad	1, 2	27 million
	58	Chad 04/2016 Link	Programme to strengthen resilience and peaceful coexistence in Chad (PRCPT)	1, 2, 4	18 million
	59	Chad. Niger. Nigeria. Cameroun 12/2016 Link	Programme de Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad - RESILAC	2	30 million
	60	Chad 06/2016 Link	Support for the social and occupational integration of young Chadians in vulnerable situations	1	10.3 million
	61	G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso. Mauritania. Mali. Niger. Chad) and Senegal 06/2016 Link	Rapid Action Groups - Monitoring and Intervention in the Sahel (GAR-SI SAHEL)	3, 4	41.6 million
	62	Chad 12/2016 Link	Programme d'appui à la formation et à la sécurité publique au Tchad	4	10 million
	63	Chad 12/2016 Link	Programme d'appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables	1	23 million
	64	Cameroon 12/2016 Link	Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun	3	3.3 million

	65	Cameroon 04/2016 Link	Response programme to deal with the effects of internal and external population movements in the Far North Region	1, 2	20 million
	66	Cameroon 04/2016 Link	Programme to promote employment and strengthen resilience in Northern Cameroon	1, 4	7 million
	67	Cameroon 04/2016 Link	Investment project in support of local economic development in the Far North Region, promoting the employment and integration of young people	1, 2, 4	10 million
	68	Ivory Coast. Ghana. Guinea. Guinea Bissau 2/2016 Link	Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants	3	13.9 million
	69	ECOWAS. G5 04/2016 Link	West African police information system/WAPIS	4	5 million
Horn of Africa	70	Sudan 04/2016 Link	Greater Stability in Eastern Sudan through better and more informed decision-making in Food Security	2	6 million
	71	Sudan 04/2016 Link	Strengthening resilience for refugees, IDPs and host communities in Eastern Sudan	2	12 million
	72	Sudan 04/2016 Link	Strengthening Resilience of IDPs, Returnees and Host Communities in West Darfur	2	7 million
	73	Sudan 04/2016 Link	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Sudan: Enhancing alternatives to first and secondary movement from Sudan	1, 2, 4	15 million
	74	Sudan 10/2016 Link	Mitigate the effect of El Niño for the host and IDP population in Red Sea, White Nile and North Darfur, Sudan	1, 2	8 million
	75	Sudan 12/2016 Link	Education Quality Improvement Programme in Sudan	2, 4	22 million
	76	Sudan 12/2016 Link	Improving Nutrition and Reducing Stunting in Eastern Sudan through an Integrated Nutrition and Food Security Approach	2, 4	8 million
	77	Sudan 12/2016 Link	Livestock Epidemio-Surveillance Project to Support Livelihoods of vulnerable rural smallholders and pastoralists	1, 2	9 million
	78	Countries participating in the Khartoum Process and the AU-Horn of Africa Initiative 12/2016 Link	Regional Operational Centre in support of the Khartoum Process and AU-Horn of Africa Initiative	3	5 million
	79	South-Sudan 10/2016 Link	Strengthening the Livelihoods Resilience of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Communities in South Sudan's cross-border areas with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda	2, 4	28 million

		South-Sudan 12/2015 Link	Provision of basic health - Health Pooled Fund	2	20 million
	80	South-Sudan 12/2015 Link	Provision of basic health - Health Pooled Fund	2	20 million
	81	South-Sudan 12/2015 Link	Improvement of delivery of basic education through improved management and teachers' training in South Sudan	2, 3	45. 6 million
	82	South-Sudan 12/2015 Link	Support to strengthening public financial management for the transparent and responsible use of resources in South Sudan	4	12 million
	83	Ethiopia 12/2015 Link	Resilience Building in Ethiopia (RESET II)	1, 2, 4	47 million
	84	Ethiopia 04/2016 Link	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia	1, 2, 4	30 million
	85	Countries participating in the Khartoum Process 12/2016 Link	Facility on Sustainable and Dignified Return and Reintegration in support of the Khartoum Process	1, 3	25 million
	86	Ethiopia 10/2016 Link	Building Resilience to Impacts of El Niño through Integrated Complementary Actions to the EU Resilience Building Programme in Ethiopia (RESET Plus)	1, 2	22.5 million
	87	Countries participating in the Khartoum Process as well as Uganda. 12/2015 Link	Better Migration Management in Support of the Khartoum Process	2, 3	40 million
	88	Ethiopia 12/2015 Link	Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia	1	20 million
	89	Uganda 12/2015 Link	Enhancing social cohesion and stability of slums populations in Kampala, Uganda	1, 2, 4	4.3 million
	90	Uganda 12/2016 Link	Rider to Support to South Sudanese Refugees in Northern Uganda	1, 2, 4	10 million
	91	Uganda 12/2015 Link	Support to South Sudan Refugees in Northern Uganda	1, 2, 4	10 million
	92	Somalia 04/2016 Link	Promoting a culture of tolerance and dialogue in Somalia (Dulqaad iyo wada hadal)	4	5 million
	93	Somalia 10/2016 Link	RESTORE - Building Resilience in Northern Somalia	1, 2	8 million
	94	Somalia 12/2015 Link	Enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and integration of mixed migration flows	1, 2, 3	50 million

	95	All countries relevant to projects under the Horn of Africa window 12/2016 Link	Monitoring and Learning System for the EU Trust Fund Horn of Africa Window	1, 2, 3, 4	2 million
	96	Kenya 12/2016 Link	Rider to Conflict prevention, peace and economic opportunities for youth	1, 2, 4	2 million
	97	All 9 countries under the Horn of Africa window of the Trust Fund 06/2015 Link	Research and Evidence Facility	1, 2 ,3 , 4	4.1 million
	98	Kenya 04/2016 Link	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme	1, 2, 4	15 million
	99	Kenya 04/2016 Link	Increased stability and inclusive economic opportunities for youth in Kenya	1, 2, 4	12 million
	100	Cross-border areas of Ethiopia. Kenya. Somalia and Sudan 12/2016 Link	Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas	1, 2, 4	63.5 million
	101	Eritrea 12/2016 Link	Support for the creation of employment opportunities and skills development in Eritrea	1	13 million
	102	IGAD countries excluding Eritrea due to its suspended membership 04/2016 Link	Towards Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD region	1, 2, 3	10 million
	103	IGAD countries excluding Eritrea due to its suspended membership 04/2016 Link	Strengthening IGAD's ability to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa	2, 4	5 million
	104	Sudan 04/2017 Link	Wadi El Ku Integrated Catchment Management Project (Phase 2)	2	10 million
	105	Sudan 04/2017 Link	Technical Cooperation Facility for Sudan 2018 – 2020	3, 4	4 million

	106	IGAD (Kenya) (All countries eligible under the Horn of Africa window) 04/2017 Link	Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region	4	40 million
	107	Kenya 28/04/2017 Link	Kenya-EU Partnership for the implementation of the Kenya CVE strategy	4	5 million
	108	Djibouti 15/12/2016 Link	Enhancing youths' professional skills and increasing the institutional capacity for sustainable employment in the transport-logistics-port sector	1	10 million

Source: own compilation from EUTF website (May 2017); * all these goals were self-coded.

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