Direkt zum Inhalt

ALMA-Review

ALMA Reviews Blog: Changing the Ontology of African Identity

Symbolbild: Person liest ein Buch
© Priscilla du Perez

Euro-centrism Versus Afro-centrism: Asouzu’s Response to the Fallacy of Dogma in African Identity 

By: Saheed Anuoluwapo Agunbiade
Published in: LAJOP vol. 5, no. 1, April, 2024

The current state of Africanness is tenuous. Hundreds of years of colonisation and decades of neo-colonialism have fundamentally altered what it means to be an African. Having lost lives, languages and cultures, many on the continent and in the diaspora question the authenticity and strength of our current culture; is there an African culture after colonialism, or are we simply reproductions of our colonial overlords on the African continent? Are Africans in the midst of an identity crisis? Is it bad if we are? In Saheed Anuoluwapo Agunbiade’s Euro-centrism Versus Afro-centrism: Asouzu’s Response to the Fallacy of Dogma in African Identity, these questions are approached via a thorough review of Afro- and Eurocentric thought paradigms as well as through the Nigerian philosopher Innocent Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology. 

Agunbiade, like many other scholars, pegs African culture as being perennially unstable due to the whirlwind of cultures and connotations invoked when the term African is applied. Does being African mean being Black or Arab? Is African culture something that existed only prior to colonisation, or is our contemporary mix of Arab, European and traditionalist value systems akin to an African culture? For the sake of simplicity, Agunbiade (p. 37) defines an African as: “an open-minded person who is embodied with the intellectual, social and cultural traditions of the Africa [sic] and also feels the need[ ] to acknowledge the interdependency of the individuals in the world in the face of [an] ever-changing global environment”. This definition notwithstanding, the question of “what African culture is” remains wholly unanswered. Agunbiade states that traditionally, this issue has been handled vis-à-vis a reversion to ethnocentrism in African and European academic spaces. 

From a Eurocentric approach, Agunbiade claims that European scholars seek to diminish foreign ontologies while uplifting their own, as a way to promote their ethnic ontology as hegemonic and correct (p. 48). Conversely, proponents of Afrocentrism seek to create and promote a uniquely African ontological position that supplants foreign ontologies to secure its own dominance. Contextualising this within his argumentation, Agunbiade argues that ethnocentrism, whether Afro- or Eurocentrism, is the incorrect approach, as ethnocentrism tends to breed conflict. 

To mitigate such conflict, Agunbiade proposes Innocent Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology, to complement the negative effects of Afro- and Eurocentrism. Ibuanyidanda, roughly translated from Igbo to mean “no load is insurmountable for the ant”, is an ontology that argues that humanity accesses its full potential when we view individuals as complementary to each other's existence and view reality through the gaps in our knowledge. The Ibuanyidanda ontology enacts this interdependent worldview by dismantling the “us” versus “them” dichotomy presented by an ethnocentric worldview, while simultaneously providing a less ego-driven synthesis of the world: “we are able to meet the other in its otherness and accept it as an extension of our ego without bias because of this universal or transcendent thinking” (p. 55). Although the Ibuanyidanda ontology promotes a harmonious acceptance of diversity, Agunbiade’s synthesis of its perspective reveals a critical gap in his argumentation.

While Agunbiade’s synthesis of ethnocentrism and the Ibuanyidanda ontology makes for an easy read and provides a refreshing look at the rather dicey topic of identity, his ultimate text lacks a proper thesis or conclusion. Although the discussion within the text is fruitful (e.g., in its comparison of thoughts and ontologies) in his conclusion Agunbiade relates his commentary only to the topic of ethnocentric conflict, without clearly relating his discussion back to the topic of African identity. One can assume that Agunbiade proposes Ibuanyidanda as a means to stabilise and alleviate conflict within the identity through the utilisation of Ibuanyidanda’s interdependent qualities; however, such an idea would need to be properly explained to meaningfully contribute to the text’s discussion. 

The answers to the questions: “Who is African?” and “What is African Culture?” remain somewhat unsatisfying. While Agunbiade does provide a self-constructed definition of an African, the “interdependency” highlighted in his definition appears to exist for the sole purpose of conflating Africanness into the Ibuanyidanda ontology. This conflation arises from the insufficient amount of reference material supporting the claim that Africans ubiquitously recognise the interdependence of individuals. Many attributes in Agunbiade’s definition appear logical and are grounded in claims made by other academics. However, the interdependency aspect of the definition seems incongruous and lacks adequate citations, raising questions about its purpose and functional validity. Due to the uncertainty of Agunbiade’s proposed definition, it remains to be seen if the Ibuanyidanda ontology would be the correct ontology to tackle identity-related instability. While it is evident that the Ibuanyidanda ontology could help mitigate the effects of ethnocentric conflict, it is not abundantly clear if this ontology could translate to a stabilisation of the African identity crisis.  

Even with these criticisms in mind, Agunbiade’s article is a refreshingly non-ethnocentric look at African identity. As it is such a rarity for African identity to be handled outside of the scope of ethnocentrism (although from a philosophical perspective), Agunbiade’s work is a noteworthy contribution to the rich discourse within African identity studies.

Review von: Lena Diakite

Alle Beiträge des ALMA-Review Blogs

ALMA Reviews Blog: Stages of Colonialism in Africa

Symbolbild: Person liest ein Buch
© Priscilla du Perez

Stages of Colonialism in Africa: From Occupation of Land to Occupation of Being

By: Hussein A. Bulhan

Published in December 2015 in the Journal of Social and Political Psychology.

Available at: https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.143 (link is external)

In this article, Hussein A. Bulhan discusses a different side of the colonial enterprise, viewing colonialism as the occupation not only of land but also of each colonised person, a condition that becomes a mechanism through which one perceives one’s existence in the world. The article is drawn from the author’s own scholarship (personal experience and reflection) and the limited academic resources available in the “peripheries” of the world where he lives and works – in Somali, Darfur and Sudan. Bulhan is nonetheless able to transcend such limitations and navigate the effects of colonialism beyond what is easily quantifiable. The author’s major themes are clearly laid out in the first five pages of his article, where he discusses the stages of colonialism and the ongoing intersection between colonialism and psychology in the form of metacolonialism, or coloniality. For a new reader of such a sensitive exploration, the article and the author’s methodological approach might appear flimsy or unorthodox, given Bulhan’s curiosity and frankness. However, with a nod to the works of the scholars who pioneered such work – particularly Frantz Fanon, the French psychiatrist who wrote extensively on the role of psychiatry and psychology in colonialism – it would be wiser to pay attention and read between the lines, feeling the author’s frustration at the misuse of these disciplines, which were meant to benefit individuals, not oppress them.  As Fanon focused on psychiatry, the author here focuses on psychology whilst drawing a linkage between psychiatry and psychology. 

In examining the history of psychology, Bulhan explores the relationship between psychology and colonialism and reveals how psychology contributed to justifying and bolstering oppression and colonialism in Africa. For him, the demise of classical colonialism, which began in 1957 with Ghana gaining independence and other African countries following suit in the 1960s and 1970s, was a critical turning point, when the ambition for freedom reached its peak. In those times, the African public found new inspiration in their own words and in those of their children, who were calling for the expulsion of the colonisers. However, whilst the colonisers did in fact leave the continent, they left behind countries unfit to govern themselves and with economies fully dependent on the countries of Europe. Bulhan regards the current situation as a neocolonial machine that continues to oppress its citizens for the benefit of former colonial empires and their allies. The material resources in Africa are being plundered for the benefit of the former colonisers. This has had tremendous consequences on the continent in terms of economic and infrastructural development. Beyond the outside economic domination over Africa, which is reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s scholarship on the scramble for Africa, the author’s analysis further highlights the role of culture and psychology in perpetuating colonialism. To do this, he proposes a new way of conceptualising colonialism – metacolonialism – which he describes as: 

"a socio-political, economic, cultural, and psychological system that comes after, along with, or among the earlier stages of colonialism …. One can also define it as a colonial system that goes beyond in scope or behind in depth what classical colonialism and neocolonialism had achieved." (p. 244)

Such a line of thought is striking, given that the effects of colonialism in major public discourse are often weighed and validated in economic terms without regard for the psychological implication of colonialism on the colonised. With metacolonialism, the author delves deeper into the psychological implications and power dynamics of colonialism, which allow the colonisers to name and interpret the world and the self while suppressing the experiences and stories of the colonised. In Belhan’s words:

"The story of the colonized remains untold due to censorship and social amnesia enforced in crude or subtle ways. If writers of this story are not directly harassed, the media industry seldom publishes their alternative story; professional journals winnow it out; publishers reject manuscripts; and tenure review committees consider it a sign of radicalism or proof of idiosyncratic obsession to excavate a long-forgotten past too uncomfortable to recall. […] If one endeavors to tell the story of the colonized, the teller is from the start stuck neck deep or totally submerged in the maelstrom or disaster the colonizer had created. Not only does one wade in the dissimulated history and scholarship of the colonizer’s metacolonial systems of education, but also the world in which one lives—including institutions for which one works—contradict one’s story about the colonized." (p.245)

What Bulhan shows in this section of his paper is not only his frustration with academia but also the frustration of many who have tried to tell a different story, their story, as it affected them. For example, the issue of censorship raised by the author is not only peculiar to the colonial enterprise in Africa but also applies to any stories or truths that do not match the conventional narrative or that offend the listener’s vanity. Yet, when we censor the narrative of the speaker we also censor our own ability to exchange meaningful ideas about how we perceive the world around us (pp. 245–246). We limit our ability to think differently in a world that contains infinite complexities. Finally, Bulhan describes how psychology and its medical counterpart, psychiatry, contributed to colonialism, thus making it imperative to decolonise the psychological sciences. As the author recounts, during the colonial period, psychologists and psychiatrists embarked on racial comparisons to determine the size of the typical African brain. They concluded from a biased sample that Africans belonged to a lower evolutionary phase of human beings (p. 249). Africans were viewed as “lobotomised Europeans” or at least as neurotic Europeans (ibid.). 

Equally relevant is the fact that, after the classical colonial period, the psychological and psychiatric literature shifted from identifying Africans as subhuman to asserting alarming rates of mass depression and other psychiatric disorders, thereby trumpeting the predominant narrative that slaves were innately incapable of living independently or sanely without a white master (ibid.). Today, such notions are rarely found in psychiatric and psychological literature, as they have become more subtle and refined in theories and their application, the author argues. Richard C. Keller, who studied the history of medicine and the relationship of psychiatry with colonialism in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, reached a similar conclusion. Like Bulhan, Keller, in his book Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa, explored the position of the mentally ill in nineteenth-century North Africa, the problem of institutionalised mental illness and the overuse of psychopathological language to describe the experience of an entire population. Both scholars are influenced by Frantz Fanon. 

While Bulhan raises critical points about the historical relationship between colonialism and psychology, there could be a deeper exploration of any potential positive contributions or efforts within the field to address the legacies of colonialism. Examples like Carl Jung, Viktor Frankl, Carl Rogers and Elisabeth Kübler-Ross would have helped show that not every psychologist or psychiatrist rejoices over the heinous legacy of the profession, be it colonialism or the imposition of the therapist’s view on the individual. This would provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between colonialism and psychology. Also, the issue of individual responsibility as opposed to institutional responsibility could have been pursued, as well as the limitations of decolonising psychological science; what does it mean, who is in the position to do it and what would be the practical implications? Addressing these points and offering strategies to overcome them would strengthen the argument and provide a more comprehensive analysis. 

 

Reviewed by: Ernest Chetachukwu Anudu


To all contributions of the ALMA Reviews Blog

Foto: © Priscilla Du Preez